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THE EUROPEAN PASTEURIZATION OF
FRENCH LAW
Mitchel de S.-O.-l'E. Lassert

In a series of stunning decisions handed down in the lastfew years, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)has condemned the decisionmaking procedures traditionally used by the French Supreme Courts (i.e., the
Cour de cassation and the Conseil d'Etat). This Article traces and critiques
this developing 'fairtrial"jurisprudence,which has also resulted in the condemnation of the supreme courts of Belgium, Portugal,and the Netherlands,
whose decisionmakingprocedures were all patterned on the French civil law
model. Finally, the Article examines the dramatic and schismatic French
responses that have ensued.
This Article offers a case study at the intersection of European law,
comparative law andjudicial theory. It begins by describing-anddistinguishing between-the interpretivepractices andjudicial theories that characterize the legal systems of France, the United States, and the European
Union. It then analyzes the complex, multifaceted, and ongoing negotiation
between these systems' divergent understandings of properjudicialpractice.
Professor Lasser concludes that the largely misguided interchange between the French supreme courts and the ECHR may well have resulted in
pasteurizingthe French civil law proceduralmodel into bland nonexistence.
The traditionallyrepublican and institutionalmodes of Frenchjudicialdecisionmaking have been forced to take on some of the more democratic and
argumentative features that characterizeECHR and, especially, American
judicial decisionmaking. Unfortunately, these reforms may grant a new argumentative prominence-and thus normative dominance-to the French
judiciary (precisely what the traditional French system was designed to
avoid), without, however, counterbalancing this new judicial power with
sufficiently effective individual,public, and argumentativejudicial accountability. Whether these reforms mark the beginning of the end or the beginning of a creative new beginning of the French civil law model of judicial
decisionmaking remains to be determined.
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INTRODUCTION

In one of his most famous articles, the late Robert Cover described courts as "characteristically 'jurispathic."'l That is, they tend
to kill-and perhaps exist precisely for the purpose of killing-the
I

Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97

HAv. L. REv. 4, 40 (1983).
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proliferation of legal meaning. 2 Professor Cover's almost poetic insight holds particular import as one considers the confluence of Europe and France, where more than just tasteful cheese enzymes now
stand to be "pasteurized" into bland nonexistence. In short, the entire French civil law model of judicial decisionmaking may now lie in
mortal peril.
The French model of supreme court judicial procedure has a
long, illustrious, and highly influential history. 3 Cemented in revolutionary distrust of the judiciary and polished by Napoleonic notions of
republican and meritocratic state administration, 4 the French model
spread into large sections of Europe and still holds firm in, inter alia,
Belgium, Portugal, the Netherlands, and-interestingly enough-the
European Union's Court of Justice. 5 Thus, France has played an extremely prominent role in the development and worldwide dissemination of a particular model of judicial decisionmaking.
Nevertheless, this French model has long been the source of horrified fascination by outsiders, and with good reason. 6 For example,
the Cour de cassation 7 composes all of its judgments as unsigned,
cryptic, single-sentence decisions without concurrences or dissents.,
Thus, for all that such judgments purport to be the deductive result of
the Code's commands, they nonetheless appear to outsiders as little
more than formalistic, unexplained-and, hence, unconstrained-judicial fiats.
To make matters worse, the more the outsider learns about the
traditional French model ofjudicial decisionmaking, the more bizarre
it seems. For instance, the two French supreme courts produce and
See id. at 40-42.
See Rolf Stfirner, Suing the Sovereign in Europe and Germany, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
RiV. 663, 663 (2003) ("The French model . . . heavily influenced the continental understanding of the relationship between administration and adjudication.").
4
See L. NEVILLE BROWN &JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 24-25 (1998);
WALTER CAIRNS & ROBERT McKEON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 27 (1995).
5
See III ROSCOE POUND,JURISPRUDENCE § 112, at 694-96 (1959) (listing national legal
systems influenced by the French Civil Code); see also Martin Shapiro, The European Court of
Justice, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW 321, 326 (Paul Craig & Grinne de Bfrca eds., 1999)
).
("[Tlhe ECJ's ... general mode of operation clearly follows a French model ....
6
See, e.g., JOHN P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 374-431 (1968); JOHN HENRY
MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADIION 36-42 (1969) (describing French modes ofjudicial
decisionmaking and procedure, only to conclude that, in the French system, "the judicial
function is narrow, mechanical, and uncreative"); POUND, supra note 5, § 103, at 422-24.
7 The Cour de cassation is the highest court to hear private and criminal law matters,
whereas the Conseil d'Etat is the supreme body with jurisdiction over most administrative,
executive, and state action cases. See CAIRNS & McKEON, supra note 4, at 37-42. In addition, a separate Constitutional Council (Conseil constitutionnel) engages in quasi-judicial review of newly passed legislation before it is promulgated. See ANDREW WEST ET AL., THE
FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION 106-07 (1992).
8 See Bernard Rudden, Courts and Codes in England, France and Soviet Russia, 48 TuLANE L. REV. 1010, 1021-22 (1974).
2
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adopt draft judicial decisions before oral arguments ever take place. 9
Furthermore, because the courts' judges generate these draft decisions through a sequestered internal process, the litigants cannot access-much less respond to-the drafts. Litigants are similarly
hampered at oral arguments: Traditionally, after the parties have argued, a judicial amicus presents his or her conclusions about how the
case should be resolved, resulting in more assertions to which the litigants cannot meaningfully respond.1 0 As if this were not enough, customarily, this amicus then retires with the judges for deliberations.' 1
Thus, in many respects, the French system offers a truly distinctive, if
largely misunderstood, model of judicial decisionmaking.
The traditional model, however, may well be taking the first major steps toward extinction. In a series of stunning decisions handed
down over the last few years, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) has held that the French supreme courts, by refusing to
make the internal arguments of its judicial magistrates appropriately
available to litigants, infringes upon the right to a fair trial guaranteed
by the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter the "European Convention"). 12
This Article offers a case study at the intersection of European
and comparative law. Specifically, the Article examines how the
ECHR and the French supreme courts have sought to resolve, or at
least mediate, the fundamental divergence between their respective
understandings of proper judicial decisionmaking procedure. By
working through the complex, multistage, and ongoing conflict be9 See BRows & BELL, supra note 4, at 102; see also MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L'E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY
50-52 (2004) [hereinafter LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS] (describing content of these

draft decisions (projets d'arrts)). For a detailed portrayal of the process by which the
French administrative courts-and, in particular, the Conseil d'Etat-renderjudgments, see
BROWN & BELL, vimpra note 4, at 90-113.
10 See BROWN & BELL, supra note 4, at 110-11.
II
See id. at 111.
12 Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides, in pertinent
part: "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing . ,. ." Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, openedfor signature Nov. 4, 1950,
Council of Europe, art. 6(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention]. A quick explanation for the uninitiated: The ECHR, whose
jurisprudence is the primary trigger for the writing of this Article, is an international tribunal situated in Strasbourg. See MARK W. JANIS ET AL., EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TEXT
AND MATEJALS 64 (2000). The ECHR has jurisdiction to secure enforcement of the European Convention, a treaty to which there are currently forty-five signatory states. See European Convention, supra, art. 19; see also Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/Commun/

ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG (listing signatures) (last visited Feb. 20,
2005). For a general introduction to the ECHR and the European human rights regime
generally, see JANIS ET AL., supra.
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tween the ECHR and various supreme courts patterned on the French
model, this Article demonstrates how both the ECHR and the French
have engaged in bad comparative-law practice. That is, each has
failed to grasp and appreciate the logic and values underlying the
other's preferred procedural model. As a result, the exchange between the ECHR and the French has largely consisted of unfocused,
vaguely uncomprehending accusations, and tepid, halfhearted responses. The consequences of this exchange, however, may well
prove to be the beginning of the end-or perhaps the beginning of a
new beginning-of the French civil law model as we know it.
The analysis proceeds as follows: Part I briefly presents the theory
and practice of the traditional French model ofjudicial decisionmaking " I As this Part explains, the French judicial system functions on
the basis of an institutionaland ultimately republican conception of judicial control and legitimacy. The basic idea is that a small corps of
elite, state-sanctioned jurists, culled in an appropriately representative
fashion from the general population and educated, trained, and constrained in a meritocratic and hierarchical institutional framework, is
entrusted with the task of debating and resolving legal controversies
in such a way as to promote the general interest and the public good.
To this end, these jurists are granted a privileged-and largely inaccessible-deliberative space in which to engage in particularly frank,
communal, and highly substantive debates that, by virtue of this seclu14
sion, are nonetheless denied the force and status of "law."
Part II traces the ongoing cycle of litigation that has pitted the
ECHR against supreme courts patterned on the French procedural
model. As Part II explains, the first real salvo in this exchange was the
ECHR's decision in Borgers v. Belgium,15 in which the court held that
the procedure used by the Belgian Cour de cassation violated the
right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the European Convention. 16 This initial blow put the French on notice that their traditional decisionmaking procedures were at risk and opened an
ongoing struggle that, to this day, has been characterized on all sides
by halfhearted and makeshift positions.
7
Part III assesses the costs and benefits of Borgers and its progeny,'
concluding that the plaintiffs' hard-fought victories in the ECHR's
Reinhardt v. France and Kress v. Francedecisions actually offer relatively
13

I have presented this analysis at length elsewhere. See

TIONS, supra note 9.
14
See ConE CIVL

LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERA-

[C. Cirv.] art. 5, translated in Rudden, supra note 8, at 1012 ("Judges
are forbidden to decide the cases submitted to them by laying down general rules.").
15
214 Eur. Ct H.R. (Ser. A) 22 (1991).
16
See id. at 33.
17
See Reinhardt and Slimane-Kaid v. France, 1998-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 640 (holding that
the Cour de cassation's procedural scheme does not afford litigants the right to a fair
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meager gains. Viewed in the particular context of the French judicial
system, the access and response rights these plaintiffs gained are of
little practical use to litigants. The costs, on the other hand, have
been major. Not only have these decisions badly damaged the French
legal system's reputation and influence, but the ECHR has also provoked the hostility of a good number of national supreme courtscourts on which the ECHR relies to properly enforce the European
Convention. Perhaps most distressing, however, is the fact that the
modest procedural concessions the ECHR has managed to wrest from
the French may have established a continuing and unhealthy dynamic
of fearful resistance, in which each supreme court finds itself compelled to abandon its condemned judicial cousins in a doomed attempt to avoid ECHR censure. In other words, the ECHR's Borgers!
Kress litigation has exerted powerful, divisive pressures on the French
supreme courts.
After working through the range of more confrontational and
submissive options available to the French judiciary following the
ECHR's Reinhardtand Kress decisions, Part IV reveals the response the
French supreme courts have actually taken: schism. That is, the
French reaction has consisted not of one response, but of two. For its
part, the Conseil d'Etat has simply refused to abandon its proud Napoleonic ethos and corresponding habits, offering the stiffest possible
resistance by all but ignoring the ECHR's decisions. The Cour de cassation, on the other hand, led by formidable Chief Justice Guy
Canivet, has adopted a startling array of reforms that not only satisfy
the ECHR's mandates, but could also mark a turning point in the history of French law.
Therefore, Part V evaluates the two distinct French supreme
court responses. As this Part makes clear, a proper evaluation must
take account of the fluid and ever-changing dynamic between the numerous courts in play. That is, read in the broader and shifting European context, the Conseil d'Etat's staunch-and seemingly quite
successful-resistance to the ECHR appears doomed to fail in the
long term, for not only have the Belgian, Dutch, and Portuguese supreme courts adapted or modified their decisionmaking procedures,
but now even the French Cour de cassation has followed suit as well.
In other words, the Conseil d'Etat-which, along with the French
Cour de cassation, was once the flagship of the French procedural
model-now consists of a retrograde remnant. The French procedural schism therefore likely represents the beginning of the end of the
traditional French procedural model.
hearing); Kress v. France, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. I (holding the same for the Conseil dEtat's procedural scheme).
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In this evolving French and European context, the Cour de cassation has therefore emerged as the active and innovating force. Breaking significantly with its past, the Cour has adopted a series of
procedural reforms that appreciably move French judicial practice in
the direction of the more democratic and argumentative mode of judicial decisionmaking propounded by the ECHR and familiar to students of American judicial practice. In short, the Cour de cassation
now grants litigants, and even the general public, an infinitely greater
degree of access to the judicial process than ever before.
Whether this procedural development is to be applauded or regretted is very much open to debate. As Part VI demonstrates, although the Cour de cassation has willingly responded to the ECHR's
awkward prodding, it is not at all clear that the Cour's reforms move
far enough in the direction of the more democratic and argumentative model ofjudicial decisionmaking favored by the ECHR. This Part
makes clear that the Cour's reforms do not merely grant dubious argumentative gains to litigants; they likewise endanger the future of the
traditionally republican and institutional foundations of French judicial control and legitimacy.
Accordingly, this Article highlights the danger lurking in the
ongoing legal exchange between Europe and France. The ECHR and
the French legal system have engaged in bad comparative-law practice, lending to compromise and the development of a hodgepodge
model ofjudicial decisionmaking procedure that is quite reminiscent
of the one deployed by the European Court ofJustice. As a result, the
Cour de cassation's reforms grant a new argumentative prominenceand, thus, a normative dominance-to the Cour and its judges, which
is precisely what the traditional French system endeavored to avoid.
At this point in time, this new judicial power has yet to be sufficiently
effectively counterbalanced by individual and/or public argumentative accountability.
I
THE TRADITION: FRENCH REPUBIICAN INSTITUTIONALISM

The best way to introduce the French judicial system to an American audience is to stress that the French and American legal systems
rest on fundamentally different conceptions of how best to deliverjustice through the judiciary. 8 That is, the notions underlying French
18

See generally LASSERJUDICIAL

DELIBERATIONS,

supra note 9, at 322-47 (comparing in

detail the core conceptions driving the French and American legal systems); Mitchel de S. 0. -I'E. Lasser,Judicial(Self-)Portraits:judicialDiscoursein the FrenchLegal System, 104 YALE L.J.
1325 (1995) [hereinafter Lasser, JudicialPortraits];Michael Wells, French and Americanjudicial Opinions, 19 YAEJ. INT'L L. 81 (1994) (exploring essential values of French and Ameri-

can systems by comparing their decisional paradigms). For a provocative analysis of the
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and American conceptions of how to generate not only good judicial
decisions, but also judicial legitimacy through judicial accountability,
control, debate, and deliberation, are really quite divergent.
A.

Of Frameworks and Ethos

The French system functions on the basis of an institutional and
republican conception ofjudicial control and legitimacy. 19 This system
aims to select, educate, and train a small corps of elite, representative,
and state-sanctioned jurists to manage their judicial decisionmaking
in an enlightened and coherent fashion.2 0 The French pursue this
goal by: (1) entrusting the judiciary with the task of handling legal
controversies in such a way as to promote the general interest and the
public good; and (2) constraining judges by placing them, throughout their careers, in a reliably meritocratic and hierarchical institutional framework. 21 Accordingly, the traditional French system grants
its judges a privileged and sequestered deliberative space in which to
engage in particularly frank, communal, and highly substantive debates that, by virtue of their very seclusion, are intentionally denied
22
the force and status of law.
The American system, on the other hand, is more protestant and
populist in character, adopting a far more immediately participatory,
argumentative, and democratic approach. 23 That is, in the absence of a
centralized, career, civil service judicial hierarchy, complete with the
educational, professional, and institutional carrots and sticks that
characterize its French counterpart, the American system places almost the entire burden of controlling and legitimating judicial deci24
sionmaking on the judicial decision itself.
different epistemological assumptions that govern common-law and civil-law systems, especially in the French and British context, see Pierre Legrand & Geoffrey Samuel, Brves
6pisteimologiques sur le droit angiais tel qu'en lui-mvnue, REVUE INTERDISCIPLINAIRE D'ETUOES
JURIDIQUES, 2005, No. 54, 1-62.
19
See LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS, supra note 9, at 303-05, 307-11, 322-37.
20 See LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS, supra note 9, at 182-85; see also JOHN BELL ET
AL., PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAw 60 (1998) [hereinafter BELL, PRINCIPLES].
21
See BELL, PRINCIPLES, supranote 20, at 64-68 (describing the promotion, duties, and
discipline of French judges).
22
See also LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS, supranote 9, at 326-28 (discussing internal

argumentative practice of French courts).
23
See also id. at 338-47 (considering "[tlhe [p]ublicly [a]rgumentative American
[m]odel").
24
See, e.g., STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO
POSTMODERNISM: AN INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE 121 (2000) ("The requirements of reasoned
elaboration meaningfully constrain judges in ways that executive officers, legislators, and

administrators are not constrained."); Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem far Tiered
Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 994 (2004) (remarking that the U.S. Supreme Court's
public legitimacy stems from, inter alia, "its practice of delivering written reasons for its
decisions . . . and a judicial tradition of arguing about constitutional meaning from a lim"[
ited range of modalities.. ."); see also Wells, supranote 18, at 88 (noting that o] ne role of
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Given that the American system traditionally grants its judges explicit honest-to-goodness lawmaking power-as evidenced by the term
"case law," for which there is, quite tellingly, no French equivalent 25this burden placed on the American judicial decision is truly enormous. 26 As a result, American judicial argumentation represents the
pledge, the proof, and the crucible of American judicial justice. Thus,
it should come as no surprise that the American system demands that
its judges take signed, individual, and public responsibility for their
arguments and imposes a rule-of-law-based transparency requirement
27
that these arguments be made immediately accessible to the public.
Together, these mandates result in a veritable explosion of readily
available American judicial argumentative justifications.
In sum, the French and American legal systems deploy very different models of judicial integrity that express fundamentally different
guiding logics: The French model offers an institutional framework
and a republican ethos, while the American model offers an argumentative framework and a democratic ethos.
B.

French Judicial Practice in a Nutshell

Given these deeply divergent structural and conceptual assumptions, it is only natural that American comparatists-and, indeed,
non-French jurists generally-have had such difficulty analyzing,
grasping, and describing the daily operation of the French judicial
system. 28 This section therefore endeavors to elucidate the elemental
features of that system, so the reader may more fully appreciate the
nature of the ongoing dispute between the French courts and the
ECHR.
1. Judicial Decisions
The public face of the French judicial system consists of a rather
impenetrable mass of stunningly formulaic judicial decisions. The
paradigm of such decisions is undoubtedly the typical Cour de cassation judgment, which always reads, more or less, as follows:
the reasoned opinion is to constrain the potentially misguided or destructive exercise of
judicial power"); LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS, supra note 9, at 3-4 (describing the
American model of judicial legitimacy).
25
See BELL, PRINCIPLES, supra note 20, at 25 ("Case law of the courts (lajurisprudence)

is not a binding. . . source of law.").
26 See also LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS, supra note 9, at 339.
27 See Wells, supra note 18, at 89-91.
28 See CAIRNS & McKEON, supra note 4, at 1 (noting the "remarkable degree of mutual
incomprehension" between the English common law and French systems); see also BELL,
PRINCIPLES, supra note 20, at 1 ("The distinctiveness of French law lies in the areas of values, legal procedure, the form of legal rules, and an attitude to law which is often described as a mentalifc").
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THE COURT-Having seen articles 5 and 1382 of the Civil Code;
Whereas the plaintiff did X; Whereas the defendant did Y; Whereas
the Appellate Court ruled Z; On these grounds, quashes the Appellate Court decision [or rejects the appeal to do so] .29

As is likely apparent, these unsigned, collegial, and'single-sentence syllogisms-which refer to neither prior judicial decisions nor the relevant academic and professional literature, refuse to disclose judicial
votes (never mind offer concurring or dissenting opinions), and make
virtually no attempt to present (or even accommodate) judicial discussions or explanations-represent the very antithesis of the U.S. Su-

preme Court's long, individually signed, policy-oriented,

and

discursive opinions.

As a result, the French judicial system has been the subject of
highly unflattering comparative critiques.3 0 In one harsh analysis after another, the French system has been accused of being crude, 3'
theoretically unsophisticated,3 2 jurisprudentially retrograde, 3 publicly disingenuous, 3 4 and, above all, deeply and damagingly
35
formalist.
Yet, as I have argued at length elsewhere, the key to understand-

ing the actual operation of the French judicial system is to recognize
29
See MERRVMAN, supra note 6, at 37-38 ("The major premise is in the statute, the
facts of the case furnish the minor premise, and the conclusion inevitably follows."); see also
Lasser,JudicialPortraits,supra note 18, at 1340-43 (describing the form and structure of the
French judicial decision); Mitchel de S.-OE. Lasser, "Lit. Theory" Put to the Test: A Compar-

ative Literary Analysis ojAmericanJudicial Tests and FrenchJudicialDiscourse, 111 HARV. L. Rsv.
689, 695-96 (1998) [hereinafter Lasser, Literary Analysis] (same). As this model judgment
suggests, when the Cour de cassation considers an appeal, it decides only whether to
"quash" (cosser) the lower court's judgment or to reject the appeal, thus allowing the lower
court's judgment to stand. See CAiRNs & McKEON, supra note 4, at 37-38.
30
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 6; see also Wells, supranote 18, at 99-103 (summarizing prominent critiques).
31
See, e.g., DAWSON, supra note 6, at 415 (refering to France's "primitive case law
technique").
32
See, e.g., MERRYMAN, supra note 6, at 18 (noting that the revolutionary fixation on
"[tihe theory of natural rights led to an exaggerated emphasis on individual rights of property and contract and to an over-sharp distinction between public and private law").
33 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAm L. Rv. 1365, 1412
(1997) (distinguishing the American and French legal traditions on the basis of the "more
realist" view of Americans, which prompts us to be "more skeptical of the source of authority," whereas the French enjoy "what to us seems a late nineteenth century formalism").
34 See, e.g., III POLND, supra note 5, § 105, at 424 (concluding that "interpretation" of
the French Code "is not genuine interpretation, but is given the name in order to satisfy an
idea that the code covers every possible case .. ." (footnote omitted)); Wells, supra note 18,
at 103 ("It seems fair, if somewhat harsh, to characterize French judicial form as a dysfunctional and deceptive facade, behind which judges exercise a creative role without offering
genuinely reasoned explanations.").
35
See, e.g., MERRYMAN, supra note 6, at 82 (asserting that, in the (French) civil-law
tradition, "[a] 11 nonlegal considerations must be excluded from the law in the interest of
certainty" and that "[c]onsiderations ofjustice or other ends of the law must be excluded
for the same reason").
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that the syllogistic French decision is but the visible tip of an ex56
tremely deep and intricate conceptual and institutional iceberg.
That is, unlike the American judicial system, which relies so heavily on
public argumentation for legitimacy, the French system bifurcates its
judicial discourse into different argumentative spheres. In other
words, the syllogistic Cour de cassation decision represents but the
published component of the Frenchjudicial system. 37 Inside the protective walls of the Cour de cassation, a second discursive sphere
exists, one that is sheltered from the general public. In that protected
internal sphere, the French judiciary adopts a second, and frankly different, mode of argumentation. 8
2.

Preparationand Deliberation

In brief, the French supreme courts' traditional decisionmaking
procedures operate as follows. lhen appeal is taken to one of the
French supreme courts,3 9 the case is assigned to a judicial panel, of
which one member will serve as the rapporteur (reporting judge) for
that case. 40 The rapporteur'sjobis to produce for her brethren a report-a document often thirty to fifty pages long-in which she
presents the procedural history of the case, the claims of the parties,
her analysis of the relevant statutory, judicial and academic materials,
her proposed solution, and finally several draftjudicial decisions, each
as perfectly syllogistic as the next (although they arrive, of course, at
different conclusions) .41
In advance of oral arguments, the rapporteur distributes these
materials to the other members of the sitting judicial panel, as well as
to ajudicial amicus. In the Cour de cassation, this amicus is called the
"advocate general," 42 and in the Conseil d'Etat he is known as the
"Commissaire du Gouvernement" (CDG). 43 At oral arguments, the rapporteuropens the proceedings by reading her summary of the procedural history and the claims of the parties. 44 Next, the attorneys can
choose to present oral arguments. Finally, the judicial amicus
36
See LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS, supra note 9, at 38-61; Lasser, Literary Analysis,
supra note 29, at 696-99.
37 See also Lasser, Literary Analysis, supra note 29, at 696 ("[T]he official portrait is
merely the public face of French adjudication.").
38
See infra Part I.B.3.
39
As noted above, there are two French supreme courts: the Cour de cassation, with
jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters, and the Conseil d'Etat, with jurisdiction over
public law matters. See supra note 7.

40

See BROWN & BELL, supra note 4, at 94.

41

See id.at 102-03.
See Lasser, JudicialPortraits,supra note 18, at 1355.
The title
of "Commissaire du Gouvernement" is rather misleading, as this person does

42

43

not represent the government. See BELL, PRINCIPLES, supranote 20, at 58-59. Instead, the

CDG researches the case and delivers an opinion to the court as a neutral party. Id. at 58.
44 See BROWN & BELL, supra note 4, at 110.
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presents his own independent opinion (conclusions). 45 The judicial
panel then retires to deliberate, often accompanied by the judicial
amicus, although he may not vote and is traditionally expected to
46
keep fairly quiet, as he has just given his opinion.
How, then, do traditional procedures shield the argumentation
of the rapporteurand judicial amicus from public view? First, the rapporteu,?s draft judicial decisions are understood to be covered by the
47
secrecy of deliberations, and are therefore unavailable to the public.
Second, the analytic and argumentative sections of her report are traditionally considered to be highly personal documents. 4 Therefore,
once the Cour has decided the case, the rapporteur customarily reclaims these sections of her report (known as her avis, i.e., her opinion) from the dossier. 49 Third, although attorneys and clients can,
though infrequently do, attend oral arguments at the Cour de cassation and Conseil d'Etat, and can, therefore, hear those sections of the
rapporteuis report and of the amicus's conclusions that are read or spoken in open court, 50 it has traditionally been extremely rare for even
these incomplete judicial arguments to be published. 51 For instance,
the French equivalent of West Reports, the Recueil Dalloz, customarily publishes-in highly edited form-some four to six conclusions and
only one or two rapportsper year from the Cour de cassation, 52 despite
the fact that a conclusions and a rapport are produced in preparation of
53
every decision, and the Cour decides some 30,000 cases every year.
See id. at 110-11.
46 See id. at 111 (noting that "[alt the most [the amicus] may be asked to clarify a
point" he made in his conclusions). In contrast, as a member of the sitting judicial panel,
the rapporteur does participate in voting and deliberations. See Lasser, Judicial Portraits,
supra note 18, at 1356-57.
47
See NouvwAu CODE DE PRtoc .uDR CrVILE [N.C.P.C.] art. 448, translated in Lasser,
Judicial Portraits,supra note 18, at 1357 n.143 ("[T]he deliberations of the judges are secret."). For a discussion of the enormous difficulty involved in getting access to these documents, see Lasser, JudicialPortraits,supra note 18, at 1357.
48
See Lasser, JudicialPortraits, supra note 18, at 1557.
49 Id. at 1371 & n.190.
50
See BRowN & BELL, supra note 4, at 109-10 (discussing the rare attendance of and
opportunity to be heard for clients and their counsel (avocats) in the Conseil d'Etat).
51 See Lasser, JudicialPortraits, supra note 18, at 1357; Lasser, Literary Analysis, supra
45

note 29, at 696. But see BELL, PINCIPLES, supra note 20, at 58 (asserting that in the case of

the Conseil d'Etat, "[t] he conclusions leading to important cases are usually published in
legal journals, in the Recueil des arrets du Conseil d'Etat or in [the Conseil d'Etat's] annual
report" (emphasis added)).
52 Correspondingly, the Cour de cassation's Annual Report, which describes the Cour's
activity during the preceding year, typically publishes just two or three additional important conclusions and one more rapport. See, e.g., 1992 RAPPORT DE LA COUR DE CASSATION
(1993).
53
In 2002, the Cour de cassation judged 23,482 civil cases and 8,814 criminal cases.
See Ministire de laJustice, Les chiffres-cls de la justice: L'ACT1VITEJUDCIAIRE, at http://
www.justice.gouv.fr/chiffres/activO3.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
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Finally, pre- and post-oral argument judicial deliberations are-not
54
surprisingly-closed to the public.
As one might reasonably expect, and as I have demonstrated at
length elsewhere, 55 when engaging in these protracted internal judicial debates, the rapporteur and judicial amicus hardly replicate the
brief, mechanical, and Code-based syllogisms of the official French judicial decision. 5 6 Instead, heavily informed by academic writing, they
argue at length about why a particular line of judicial decisions
57
should-or should not-be maintained, modified or overturned.
Far from offering dry textual deductions, these arguments primarily
focus on institutional, economic, social, or other policy concerns, the
need to modernize the law to adapt to changing social realities, and,
most often, issues of fundamental fairness and good old-fashioned
58
equity.
In short, there exists a truly remarkable disparity between the internal and external modes of French judicial argumentation. Nevertheless, this duality of French judicial argument should not be
perceived as some form of judicial duplicity or disingenuousness.5 9
Rather, the French have devised a very carefully and cleverly designed
judicial system that simply operates on a tremendously different set of
conceptual and material assumptions than its American counterpart.
3.

The Argumentative Sphere

As the preceding section has shown, the French judicial system
takes great care to establish a protected discursive sphere in which its
magistrats may engage in frank and high-level judicial conversations
about how best to handle the cases submitted to them. Thus, it is
terribly important that any analysis of the French legal system come to
terms with the judicial discourse that operates within this internal
See supra note 47 (discussing the secrecy of judicial deliberations).
See Lasser,JudicialPortraits,supra note 18, at 1355-1402 (scrutinizing the "unofficial
discourse" of French magistrats).
56
See LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS, supranote 9, at 47-60 (analyzing the argumentative style of conclusions and rapporttaken from actual cases before the Cour de cassation);
Lasser, JudicialPortraits,supra note 18, at 1358-69 (same).
57
See Lasser, Judicial Portraits,supra note 18, at 1358-69. For an utterly exhaustive
analysis of revirements in the French administrative law appellate tribunals, see HUGUES LE
BERRE, LES REVIREMENTS DE JURISPRUDENCE EN DROIT ADMINISTRATIF DE L'AN VIII A 1998
(1999).
58 See Lasser, Judicial Portraits,supra note 18, at 1388; Lasser, Literary Analysis, supra
note 29, at 698-99; see also Vernon Valentine Palmer, FromEmbrace to Banishment: A Study of
JudicialEquity in France,47 AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 300-301 (1999) (observing that the conclusions and report "show an intense study of the interplay between the public interest, policy,
equity, the learned doctrine, and prior court rulings").
59 See id. at 699; cf DAWSON, supra note 6, at 410-11 (speaking of French judicial
"ventriloquism"); Palmer, supra note 58, at 299-301 (describing the "underground" exercise of French judicial equity power as terribly misleading but inevitable).
54
5-

1008

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:995

sphere. First, this discourse offers the argumention used by French
judges in the performance of their daily tasks. Second, this internal
discourse is enabled, and even promoted, by traditional French judicial procedure. Finally, this discourse possesses a complex and meaningful relation to the syllogistic public discourse of French judicial
decisions.
By establishing such conventions as the submission of the advocate general's conclusions and rapporteur's report-which includes at
least two draft decisions-to the sitting judicial panel in each important case, the French system normalizes and institutionalizes the custom of particularly lengthy and detailed judicial debate.6 0 Although
the French model thus promotes serious and frank judicial dialogue,
such dialogue overwhelmingly occurs within the French judicial institution. 61 That is, to promote candid and open debate, traditional procedures quite zealously protect judicial deliberations from the view of
the general public. 62 This argumentative seclusion allows French
magistratsto engage in forms of debate that rarely occur in public judicial arenas-namely, open-ended discussions that explicitly revolve
around the charged issues of equity, substantive justice, and socially
responsive legal adaptation.6
4.

Sources of the Law

Although the French legal system thus fosters the development of
these frank, high-level, and normative judicial debates, it makes sure
to meet the dangers that they pose by instituting appropriate structural constraints. The primary maneuver-which represents the intellectual key to the entire French approach-is the doctrine of "sources
of the law," which denies to judicial interpretations, decisions, and
64
norms the status of full-fledged law.
According to this theory, only the political branches of government can produce law. Judges must not usurp this legislative (and ex60
See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. The reader should note that this
Article primarily discusses the practice of the Cour de cassation as exemplary of the French
procedural model. The Conseil d'Etat employs parallel procedural structures, albeit with
some significant differences. Nicolas Rainaud offers perhaps the most sustained and suggestive French analysis of the internal decisionmaking procedures of the Conseil d'Etat.
See NiCoLAS RAINAUD, LE COMMISSAnIE DU GOUVERNEMEN-T PRkS LE CONSEL D'WTAT (1996).
For a thorough survey in English, see BROwN & BELL, supra note 4.
61 See Lasser, JudicialPortraits,supra note 18, at 1357 (noting that the conclusions and
rapports, which embody this frank judicial dialogue, "represent documents internal to the
French judicial system").
62 See supra note 47.
63 See LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS, supra note 9, at 324; sources cited supra note
59.
64

See generally BELL, PRINCIPLES, supranote 20, at 13-36 (discussing sources of law and

hierarchy of norms in the French legal system).
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ecutive) lawmaking power, because to do so would violate the most
fundamental premise of a republican form of government.6 5 That is,
judges are unelected civil servants whose very purpose is to apply the
popular will as codified by elected representatives functioning in the
name of the People. 66
In an important sense, furthermore, judges cannot usurp this lawmaking power, because the theory of the sources of the law categorically defines law as legislative in origin. 67 Law is not simply a
normative rule that produces and reflects legal relations, effects, or
consequences, nor is it simply a prediction or description of how judicial or administrative officials will act in particular cases. 68 Above all,
law is a rule, or set of rules, that has been formally adopted by the
legislature in the form of loi (legislation) or by the executive in the
form of decrees or regulations. 69 At the edges, law may sometimes be
popular in origin, taking the form of custom. 70 But generally, law is
composed of norms that possess a special and binding status, a status
traditionally reserved for the products of the political branches as an
expression of the popular will 7' and thus refused, both by definition
and on principle, to judicial decisions.
That said, the French are by no means blind to the fact that
judges play a highly significant role in the elaboration, development,
and modification of normative rules. 7 2 Indeed, everything in the internal French judicial discursive sphere and in the arguments of academic doctrine demonstrates otherwise. Since at least the end of the
65 See id. at 14 ("In Rousseau's terms, legislation is an expression of the gencral will,
such that a free people is only bound by the laws which they have made for themselves.").
66 See id. at 14-15; see also LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS, supranote 9, at 35 (defining "fundamental parameters" of the judicial function according to French separation of
powers).
67
See LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS, supra note 9, at 171-72.
68 This is to be compared to definitions of law advanced by the American tradition of
Legal Realism, namely, that law is what "courts are likely to do in fact" or what "officials do
about disputes." See, e.g., KARL LLEWELILYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW
AND ITS STUDY 3 (1930); O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. Rzv. 457, 461
(1897).
69

See BELL, PRINCIPLES, supra note 20, at 14-15 (distinguishing these "formal" sources

of law from other influential legal writings).
70
See id.at 14 ("Custom derives its legal force from the practice of the people who
believe it is legally obligatory.").
71 Article 6 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 categorically states: "Loi [legislation] is the expression of the general will. All citizens have the
right to participate in its creation, either personally or through their representatives ...."
Ministry of Justice, Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 26 Aug. 1789, at
http://wwwjustice.gouv.fr/anglais/europe/addhc.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
72 See BELL, PRINCIPLES, supra note 20, at 15 (observing that, although judicial decisions lack the constitutional legitimacy of legislation and executive enactments, the French
system "does not deny that they have a great influential role in shaping [the] understanding of law").
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nineteenth century, 73 and perhaps all the way back to the very inception of the Civil Code,7 4 French jurists have taken it for granted that
the law inevitably would contain gaps, conflicts, and ambiguities that
would become more important over time. 75 As a result, these jurists
recognized that judges would necessarily exercise significant normative authority and control in the French civil legal system, notwithstanding public appearances to the contrary. But this does not mean,
according to the theory, that French judges create law. 76 Even if these
judicial norms may operate in fact as important normative rules and
may become real law (by eventual legislative action or the development of custom), that does not mean that they are law, in and of
themselves.
This canonical understanding of the sources of law can be analogized to Bruce Ackerman's two-track constitutionalism. 77 That is, the
French legal system engages in two different, but highly related and
interdependent, modes of decisionmaking. 78 These two modes function by different means and yield norms of fundamentally different
status: first, routine decisionmaking, performed by judicial magistrats
as they decide ordinary disputes; and second, especially important
decisionmaking, performed by popularly elected, representative, and
primarily legislative bodies. 79 The first type of decisionmaking generates jurisprudence (not binding "case law" in the American sense),8°
whereas the second yields law proper (loi).81 All players in the French
legal system recognize that both loi and jurisprudenceproduce important normative effects, but this absolutely does not mean that French
82
judges "make law."
73

See FiRANCiOIS GNY,

MTHODE D'INTERPRIfTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PR1Vf POSITIF

(2d ed. 1919).
74 To appreciate this point, one need only read the highly perceptive and pragmatic
introductory remarks made by the Code's primary author, Portalis. See Portalis, Discours
prdliminaire,prononce le 24 thermidoran VIII (1799), reprintedin OTTo KAHN-FREUND ET AL., A
SOURCE-BoOK ON FRENCH LAw 233-39 (rev. 3d ed. 1991).
75
See LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS, supra note 9, at 45. See generally REN9 DAVID,
FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 179 (Michael Kindred trans.,
1972) (noting that "[t]he principles posed by the codes.., must be made more precise in
their practical application, adapted to new needs, interpreted in accordance with circumstances of all kinds").
See id. at 181 ("J]udicial decisions are not a source of law in France. Strictly speak76
ing, they never create legal rules.").
77 See 1 BRUCE ACKERmAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6 (1991) (distinguishing between decisions made by the American people and decisions made by their government).
See LASSER,JUDICIAL DEUBERATIONS, supra note 9, at 174.
78
See LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS, supra note 9, at 174.
79 See id.
80
See BELL, PRINCIPLES, supra note 20, at 25.
81
See LASSER, JUDiCIAL DELuRFEATIONS, supra note 9, at 174.
82 See id.
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This characteristic French notion of the sources of law therefore
serves a fundamental mediating function in the French legal system.
It recognizes the creative normative role played by the French judiciary, while simultaneously denying the resulting judicial norms the status of law. This difference in status between judicial norms and
legislated law allows for judicial norm creation precisely because it denies such norms the status of law. This mediation therefore maintains
French legislative supremacy and the strict separation of powers while
recognizing, and even encouraging, a legitimate, de facto judicial role
in the creation, development, and management of legal norms.
5.

The Judicial Syllogism in Context

The judicial syllogism symbolizes and entrenches the carefully
constructed limitation that the "sources of the law" doctrine places on
judicial authority. Thus, the traditionally syllogistic form of the
French Cour de cassation decision has little or nothing to do with
formalism, in the sense of an over-developed faith in the ability of
textual norms to lead deductively and inexorably to required interpretive solutions. Instead, this syllogistic form makes a point about priorities: only the political branches are the legitimate producers of truly
legal norms. In addition, however, it serves a highly practical purpose:
it de-fangs the judicial decision. Requiring the decision to be composed in a highly formulaic style that refuses to cite past decisions
renders that decision too uninformative to serve effectively as the sole
focal point of future legal analysis, never mind to appropriate the status of law. In an important sense, placing this inherent conceptual
cap on the legal authority of their work product liberates French judicial magistrats to engage in careful, but routine, residual normative
management.
Nonetheless, even this formal constraint does not offer enough
protection. Accordingly, the French system further weakens and
decenters the impact of its formulaic judicial decisions by pairing
83
In any
them with distinctly more informative academic analyses.
essay
academic
an
publish
actually
French
the
case of importance,
8 4
case
This
decision.
right alongside the brief-even cryptic-judicial
commentary presents and explains the judgment in some detail,
places it in the context of other relevant judicial decisions and academic analyses, and assesses the decision's doctrinal, theoretical, and
See id. at 40-45 (elucidating the "utterly central role" academic notes play in the
83
French legal system).
See id. at 40; see also Lasser,JudicialPortraits,supra note 18, at 1343-44 (examining
84
case note published alongside leading case concerning the calculation of damages).
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pragmatic policy significance.8 5 Published in the major case reports,
these doctrinal notes therefore forever frame and critique-and thus
86
serve as the mediating filter for-the judgments they accompany.
As a result, the French judiciary loses much of its ability to control
the normative content and impact of its own decisions. In any given
instance, both the judgment and the note play significant interpretive
and normative roles. Over time, therefore, the two engage in a longterm conversation 8 7 that necessarily emphasizes the more accessible
debates contained in the jurist's doctrinal note far more than the inaccessible-and, indeed, nonexistent-opinions of individual judges., s
Given this ongoing dialogue, it makes sense that French legal theory
classically categorizes both the judicial decisions and the academic
notes as autoritis;89 both are highly persuasive authorities on what the
law is, but neither constitutes law, plain and simple. 90
6.

Hierarchy and Meritocracy

Having thus controlled the normative authority of the courts, the
French also make sure to control the individual judges who operate in
those courts. To begin, the French reject the use of single-judge
courts in all but the most trivial cases. 91 Moreover, because the French
system insists on univocal, collegial decisions, any individual judge is
always surrounded and bounded by peers and superiors, who can ex92
ert significant influence on his vested career interests.
This institutionalmode of judicial control lies at the heart of the
French legal system, the guiding principles of which are centraliza93
tion, education, meritocracy, hierarchy, teamwork, and expertise.
Thus the Cour de cassation, for example, consists of an elite, carefully
85
See LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS, supra note 9, at 40-45; Lasser, JudicialPortraits,
supra note 18, at 1343-44.
86

See LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS, supra note 9, at 304 ("The French practice of

publishing... notes alongside importantjudicial decisions significantly changes the process
of reading, understanding, and evaluating those judicial decisions.").
87 See id.

88

See id. (remarking that "the doctrinal note explicitly offers much that the French

judicial decision does not ..

").

See Lasser, Judicial Portraits,supra note 18, at 1405.
See BELL, PRINCIPLES, supra note 20, at 15; JEAN CARBONNIER, 1 DROIT CIVIL 122-27
90
(1967) ; 2 GtNY, supra note 73, at 53-56; FRANCOIS TERRE, INTRODUCTION GENERALE AU
DROIT 257 (4th ed. 1998).
91
See DAVID, supra note 75, at 55; e.g., WEST ET AL., supra note 7, at 87 (describing
guidelines for how many judges will sit in a given case before the civil courts of first instance (Tribunaux de Grande Instance)). The telling French expression is: "Jugeunique, juge
inique." ("A single judge is an inequitable judge").
92
See DAVIn, supra note 75, at 55; see also WEST ET AL., supra note 7, at 110-12 (discussing formal restrictions and modes of discipline of the French judiciary).
93 See LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS, supra note 9, at 308. For a discussion of the
history, course of training, and general character of France's career judiciary, see generally
DAVID, supra note 75, at 53-59.
89
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selected and rigidly trained corps of career civil servant magistrats
groomed-or "formed," to use a particularly telling French expression-by the French State itself.94 The same holds true of all the
other major, repeat players who have a significant daily say in French
judicial decisionmaking. 95
Perhaps the clearest example of this model emerges in the
French administrative law context. The Conseil d'Etat represents the
very symbol of the Napoleonic republican and meritocratic ethic of a
properly state-selected and trained administrative elite, entrusted with
the task of debating and resolving issues of legal policy in the name of
the public good and general interest. 96 In this characteristically
French system, students hoping to enter the administrative hierarchy
work their way through the relentless-but free-state education system, 97 taking an endless series of national exams, through which they
are officially ranked relative to their peers; accordingly, getting or not
getting admitted into the national school of administration, the Ecole
nationale d'administration(ENA); taking even more exams for further
ordinal ranking; and, finally, choosing their initial posts in the strict
order of the final class rankings.9 8 Once successful candidates have
thus earned a place in the judiciary, they will ascend through the
ranks in a similarly ordered and meritocratic fashion. 99
The same basic model holds true in the French civil judiciary,
where the Cour de cassation lies at the top of an endless career judicial civil service hierarchy that begins-assuming sufficiently high
grades-with the post-law school, state-administered entrance examinations for the French national judge school, the Ecole nationale de la
magistrature(ENM), with its three-year classroom and internship training.100 This same model recurs in the academic context, where an
explicitly meritocratic, national examination-based State legal aca94
Needless to say, the professional values such a form of advancement inculcates may
be subject to critique. In an aptly titled book, Main Bancaud raises such concerns. See
AAIN BANCAUD, LA HAUTE MAGISTRATURE JUDICIAIRE ENTRE POLITIQUE ET SACERDOCE: OU
LE CULTE DES VERTUS MOYENNES (1993).
95
See DAVID, supra note 75, at 53.

96
See generally SUDHIR HAZAREESINGH, POLITICAL TRADITIONS IN MODERN FRANCE 65-96
(1994) (setting forth the ideology underlying the Napoleonic conception of a republican
administrative state); EzRA N. SULEIMAN, POLITICS, POWER, AND BUREAUCRACY IN FRANCE:
THE ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE (1974) (same).

97

See SULEIMAN, supra note 96, at 83-84 (discussing the importance of the examina-

tion as the "chief criterion" for selection and elimination).

98
99

See id. at 94-98.
See Mitchel de S.-OI'E. Lasser, Trois Palais:Deux Styles?, in LF

DROIT CIVIL, AVANT

TOUT UN STYLE? 121, 141-43 (Nicholas Kasirer ed., 2003). jean-Luc Bodiguel offers a par-

ticularly fine-grained sociological and almost ethnographic analysis of the French judicial
system's promotion process. SeeJrAN-Luc BODIGUEL, LES MAGISTRATS, UN CORPS SANS AME ?

63-124 (1991).
See CAIRNS & McKEON, supra note 4, at 45-46. For an excellent description of the
100
recruitnerit and training of these judges, see GROUPE DE TRAVAIL PRtSIDE PAR MAGISTRATS
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demic hierarchy (crowned at the top by the agrggation) establishes the
elite corps of hugely influential writers of doctrine,who assume primary
responsibility for explaining, disseminating, and thus, developing
French judicial jurisprudence.10 1 In fact, even the attorneys who argue
before the two French supreme courts comprise a small corps of some
100 attorneys-known as the avocats aux conseils-who hold a license
10 2
controlled by state monopoly.
In short, the dualism and bifurcation of French judicial discourse
are part and parcel of a highly centralized, intentionally meritocratic,
republican hierarchy of state-sanctioned elites who operate dynamically together to guide the daily operation of the judicial system. To
this end, all important cases are funneled through a tiny group of
attorneys and decided by a very small corps of expert judges, in close
deliberative collaboration with a similarly small number of highly influential academics. The guiding idea is that dailyjudicial administration and interpretive management, as opposed to lawmaking, should
proceed internally by means of particularly frank, personal, communal, and highly substantive debates between a corps of properly selected, inculcated, trained, motivated, state-sanctioned-and thus
representative-and rather normatively unified elites. These elites
are considered trustworthy because they are controlled by powerful
educational, meritocratic, and institutional means.
7.

Tying it All Together

The French offer a carefully considered judicial system, of which
the syllogistic judicial decision represents but one important facet.
On the one hand, this system limits the individual and collective
power of its judges. On the other, it recognizes the need for these
judges to exercise routine interpretive and normative management.
The system responds, therefore, by constructing a sheltered argumentative sphere that enables frank, informed, and expert debate while
simultaneously denying the judiciary the ability to exert monopoly
control over the resulting interpretive and normative decisions. In
ET AvOCATs: FORMATION, CARiuiRE, AcrTTE PROFESSIONNELLE-RAPPORT AU GARDE DES

ScEAux 38 (Collection des rapports officials, 1987).
101
For a wonderful comparative analysis of the role played by French academic doctrine, see PHILIPPE JEsTAZ & C11RuSTOPHEJAMIN, LA DOCrRINE (2004). See supranotes 86-90
and accompanying text.
102
D~cret n ° 91-1125 du 28 octobre 1991 relatifaux conditions d'accs Ala profession
d'avocat au Conseil d'ttat et A la Cour de cassation ; lordonnance du 10 septembre 1817
relative aux avocats aux conseils et Ala Cour de cassation, modifide en dernier lieu par la
loi n' 90-1259 du 31 decembre 1990 portant rfforme de certaines professions judiciaires et
juridiques, et notamment son article 3; le drcret n* 78-380 du 15 mars 1978 portant application A la profession d'avocat au Conseil d'Etat et A la Cour de cassation de la loi n' 66879 du 29 novembre 1966 relative aux soci~tes civiles professionnelles; see also WEST ET AL.,
supranote 7, at 113 (describing the privileges and duties of avocats).
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summary, the French legal system legitimates judicial decisionmaking
first by limiting its legal status; then by creating a common and unified
normative field through the educational formation of republican
elites; and finally by policing that normative field through hierarchical
institutional structures.
II
THE FRANCO-EUROPEAN STRUGGLES: INTERJUDICIAL PARRY
AND THRUST

In a series of astonishing decisions handed down over the past
few years, t0 3 the ECHR has held that, by refusing to make the internal
arguments of its two key magistrats(the rapporteurand the judicial amicus) appropriately available to litigants, both French supreme courts
violate the right to a fair trial guaranteed by the European Convention. 10 4 The impact of this line of decisions, however, extends well
beyond Paris and, for that matter, well beyond France. For what is at
stake in these decisions is not merely "French"judicial procedure, but
rather the highly influential French civil-law model of supreme court
judicial decisionmaking, as the influence of the French model ofjudicial decisionmaking carried over into the supreme courts of, inter alia,
Belgium, Portugal, the Netherlands, and, perhaps most interesting of
1 5
all, to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) itself. 0
Given these tremendously high stakes, the ECHR's line of decisions has provoked a long and ongoing sequence of parries and
thrusts between these various high courts and the ECHR. The national courts have tried, seriatim, to convince the ECHR (1) of the
legality of their respective age-old legal traditions and, failing that, (2)
of the adequacy of the remedial measures that they have taken in response to the ECHR's budding Article 6(1) jurisprudence. This struggle takes on increased importance in light of the fact that the
predicament of the French supreme courts is embedded in a wider
and more significant European civil-law context.

See supra note 17.
See id.
105
See supra notes 3 and 5 and accompanying text. The ECJ, which sits in Luxembourg, is an entirely different court than the ECHR. It is, in effect, the court of last resort
of the judicial branch of the European Union (EU). See James E. Pfander, Government
103
104

Accountability in Europe: A ComparativeAssessment, 35 GO. WASH. INT'L L. Rv. 611, 635-36
(2003) (summarizing the ECJ's position as an enforcement authority in the EU). The EU

is a complex transnational and intergovernmental organization of twenty-five member
states, all of which are also signatories of the European Convention of Human Rights. See
Stephen C. Sieberson, The Proposed European Constitution-Will It Eliminate the EUs Democratic Deficit?, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 173, 249 (2004).
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Round 1: The Gathering Storm

The ECHR's condemnation of the French procedural model
came as something of a surprise. As far back as 1970, the Court had
entertained a challenge to the Belgian Supreme Court's procedure in
the context of criminal appeals.10 6 In its seminal Delcourt v. Belgium
judgment, however, the ECHR rejected that challenge in terms that
could hardly have been more categorical. 10 7 The crux of the Delcourt
judgment is as follows: The judicial amicus before the Belgian Supreme Court in criminal matters (the Procureurginral)"cannot ... be
considered [to function] as a party" and was, therefore, not subject to
partisan adversarial procedure.108 The amicus is neither "the virtual
adversary" of criminal defendants, "nor does he become their actual
adversary when he submits in open court [his "conclusions"] that their
arguments cannot be accepted."1 0 9 The Procureurgeneral was simply
"an independent official attached to the highest court in Belgium as
10
its assistant and adviser.""
The Court explained:
The Procureurgindral's department at the Court of Cassation is, in a
word, an adjunct and an adviser of the Court; it discharges a function of a quasi-judicial nature. By the opinions which it gives according to its legal conscience, it assists the Court to supervise the
lawfulness of the decisions attacked [by the appeal] and to ensure
the uniformity of judicial precedent.
Examination of the facts shows that these considerations are
l
not abstract or theoretical but are indeed real and actual.' I
Given that the judicial amicus could not be considered a party to
the proceeding or an adversary of the accused, neither the accused's
inability to receive prior notice of or respond orally to the amicus's
opinion (his "conclusions"), nor the amicus's presence in deliberations
violated the principle of equality of arms.' 2 In short, Delcourt represented a thorough vindication of the French-derived Belgian
procedure.
106
107

108
109
110

See Delcourt v. Belgium, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) 1 (1970).
See id.
See id. at 16 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Id. at 18.
Id. at 20.

II
Id. at 18.
112 See id. at 19-20. The right to "equality of arms" provides that each party to a proceeding should have equivalent procedural opportunities to be heard. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of CriminalJustice: Identifying International Procedural
Protectionsand EquivalentProtections in National Constitutions,3 DuxiEJ. CoMip. & INT'L L. 235,
278 ("In large part it can be said that this right is the European counterpart to the common law right of due process.").
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Nonetheless, some twenty years later, thunder struck. In the
Borgers v. Belgium case, the ECHR faced a virtually identical challenge
113
This
to the same procedures of the Belgian Cour de cassation.
indeed
did
approach
Belgian
the
that
held
ECHR
time, however, the
violate the right to a fair trial guaranteed by the European Convention
11 4
on Human Rights.
Arguing in terms almost diametrically opposed to those it used in
Delcourt, the ECHR cast grave doubts on the traditional decisionmaking procedures employed by all European supreme courts patterned
on the French model. Explaining that the ECHR's "fair trial" case law
had "undergone a considerable evolution... notably in respect of the
importance attached to appearances and to the increased sensitivity of
the public to the fair administration of justice," the Strasbourg Court
methodically undid its Delcourt jurisprudence. n 5
First and foremost, the ECHR now reasoned, the judicial amicus
1 6
Although
could not be considered neutral vis-A-vis the accused.
"the independence and impartiality of the Court of Cassation and its
procureur genrars department remain entirely valid,"' 17 the ECHR
declared:
Nevertheless the opinion of the procureurgndrals department cannot be regarded as neutral from the point of view of the parties to
the cassation proceedings. By recommending that an accused's appeal be allowed or dismissed, the official of the procureur gdndrals
department becomes objectively speaking his ally or his opponent.
In the latter event, Article 6 § 1 requires that the rights of the defence and the principle of equality of arms be respected.11 8
The ECHR's reasoning was straightforward. As per the French
model, the accused (Borgers) had not received prior notice of the
advocate general's opinion, nor was he granted the opportunity to
respond to it, either orally (as the advocate general speaks last at oral
9
Given
arguments) or in writing (as this is forbidden by statute)."
that the advocate general's opinion was unfavorable to his position,
Borgers "had a clear interest" in being able to respond to it.120 Therefore, the Strasbourg Court could not "see the justification for such
[Belgian] restrictions" on the accused's ability to address the advocate
121
general's legal conclusions.
113
114
115

116
117

See Borgers v. Belgium, 214 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) 22 (1991).
See id. at 33.
See id. at 31.
See id.at 32.

118

Id. at 31.
Id. at 32.

119

Id.

120

Id.
Id.

121
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Finally, the ECHR faulted the traditional practice of allowing the
advocate general to join the judicial panel in deliberations:
Further and above all, the inequality was increased even more by
the avocat g&ra's participation, in an advisory capacity, in the
Court's deliberations ....Even if such assistance was... limited in
the present case [to merely stylistic help in drafting the Court's
judgment], it could reasonably be thought that the deliberations
afforded the avocat gn6ral an additional opportunity to promote,
without fear of contradiction by the applicant, his submissions to
122
the effect that the appeal should be dismissed.
Thus, the Belgian procedure violated Article 6(1) of the European
Convention by infringing upon the "rights of the defence ...the principle of the equality of arms," and the doctrine of "appearances."' 23
Needless to say, the Borgers decision came as no small shock to
those European supreme courts patterned on the French model, most
notably those of Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, and, of course,
France itself. Suddenly cast under a cloud of suspicion, each now
scrambled to respond; and once again, the Belgian Cour de cassation
was the first to draw the ECHR's attention.
The other shoe dropped in Vermeulen v. Belgium.1 24 In response
to the Borgers decision, the Belgian Cour de cassation had significantly
changed its procedural rules in criminal cases. Now, not only could
the accused respond to the oral arguments of the judicial amicus, but
the amicus was also barred from attending the deliberations of the
sitting judicial panel. 125 In civil cases, however, the Belgian court saw
no reason to change its time-honored procedure, because neither
party in a private law action would be in a structurally different position than the other or could reasonably be mistaken for the
prosecutorial arm of the state. 126 Furthermore, members of the specialized Cour de cassation bar would represent both parties.' 27 Thus,
even in the unlikely event that the parties themselves were to attend
oral argument, they could hardly mistake the judicial amicus for an
8
opponentY'
The ECHR rejected these Belgian justifications out of hand. Noting first that "the nature of the functions of the procureurggnhrals department at the Court of Cassation... does not vary according as the
case is a civil or a criminal one,"'129 the ECHR reasoned as follows:
122

Id. at 32.

123

Id. at 32.

124

128

1996-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 224.
See id. at 231.
See id. at 232-33.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 232-33.

129

Id. at 233.

125
126
127
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31. As in its judgment in the Borgers case (see p. 32, § 26), the
Court considers ...

that great importance must be attached to the

part actually played in the proceedings by the member of the
procureurgntraIsdepartment, and more particularly to the content
and effects of his submissions. These contain an opinion which derives its authority from that of the procureurggn6rars department itself. Although it is objective and reasoned in law, the opinion is
nevertheless intended to advise and accordingly influence the Court
of Cassation ....

33. Regard being had, therefore, to what was at stake for the
applicant in the proceedings in the Court of Cassation and to the
nature of the submissions made by . . . the avocat gengral, the fact

that it was impossible for Mr. Vermeulen to reply to them before the
end of the hearing infringed his right to adversarial proceedings.
That right means in principle the opportunity for the parties to a
criminal or civil trial to have knowledge of and comment on all evidence adduced or observations filed, even by an independent member of the national legal service, with a view to influencing the
court's decision ....
The Court finds that this fact in itself amounts to a breach of
Article 6 § 1.
34. The breach in question was aggravated by the avocat gnbrafs participation in the court's deliberations, albeit only in an advisory capacity. The deliberations afforded the avocat gnra4 if only
to outward appearances, an additional opportunity to bolster his
submissions in private, without fear of contradiction (see the
Borgers judgment previously cited, p. 32, § 28) ....
There has therefore been a breach of Article 6 § 1 in this re130
spect also.
The ECHR thus entrenched its Borgers holding while expanding
its applicability. The only consolation for the Belgian Cour de cassation was that it was no longer to suffer in isolation: On the very same
day that the ECHR rendered its Vermeulen judgment, the Court also
condemned-in strictly identical terms-the parallel procedure used
by the Portuguese Supreme Court in its labor and employment
cases.13
B.

Round 2: The French Under Fire

Needless to say, French jurists could hardly fail to grasp the significance of the ECHR's growing Borgers jurisprudence. Each of these
ECHRjudgments was duly reported in the major French case reporters, and each of these judgments appeared alongside a commentary
130
131

Id. at 233-34.
See Lobo Machado v. Portugal, 1996-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 195, 206-07.
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written by a noted French academic, who drew the obvious conclusion
132
that the traditional French procedures were at risk.
In anticipation of the ECHR challenges that were sure to follow,
the French supreme courts took preemptive measures that can most
generously be described as makeshift. The Cour de cassation in particular adopted a defensive strategy comprised of pasting together minor procedural adjustments while foregrounding and formally
recognizing what had previously been informal and rarely used professional courtesies. The net effect of the French Cour de cassation's
approach was to produce a colorable argument that its procedures
were distinguishable from those of its Belgian counterpart.
First, the Cour would provide litigants with summary indications
of the rapporteur's and advocate general's respective positions during
the week before oral arguments. Thus, a new practice was instituted,
whereby the rapporteurwould include an annotation "on the list of
cases distributed a week before the hearing to the [specialized] lawyers practicing [before the French supreme courts]. '"133 This annotation would indicate whether the reporting judge recommended
"allowing the appeal in whole or in part, declaring it inadmissible, or
dismissing it ....1.34 Similarly, the advocate general was systematically
to "inform the parties' lawyers no later than the day preceding the
3..",,a5
Second, the
[oral] hearing of the tenor of his submissions ..
Cour would allow parties to respond to the advocate general's oral
arguments, either orally or-more typically-by submitting a written
note for the judges to read in deliberations. 1-6 The French argued
that these measures, combined with "the high degree of specialisation
of the lawyers practicing [before the French supreme courts]," were
sufficient to ensure that the Cour de cassation's procedures complied
1 37
with "the adversarial principle."'
The ECHR was not convinced. In Reinhardt and Slimane-Kaid v.
France,the Strasbourg Court held that the French Cour de cassationthe very symbol of the French model of civilian judicial decisionmaking-violated the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6(1) of the
European Convention. Nevertheless, the makeshift French measures
did force the ECHR to base its Reinhardtdecision on somewhat differ132

See, e.g., Respect du principe du contradictoire: interdiction pour le demandeur dans une

instance civile en cassation de repondre aux conclusions prises d l'audience par un magistrat du

ministirepublic pros la Cour de cassation, CEDH, Feb. 20, 1996, D. 1997 somm. 208, Note
Fricero; Raymond Martin, Faut-il supprinmer le ministire public? (devant lesjuridictions administratives), RTD civil 1998, at 873.
See Reinhardt and Slimane-Kaid v. France, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 640, 664.
133
134
Id.
Id. at 666.
135
136
See id. at 657.
Id. at 664-65.
137
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ent grounds than those it had proffered in its previous judgments denouncing the Belgian and Portuguese courts. The primary problem
with the revamped French procedures, according to the ECHR, was
that they still granted unequal access to the rapporteu'swork product."'
Traditional practice required the rapporteurto transmit to the advocate general the totality of his written work product well in advance of
oral argument. 139 This work product included: (a) the rapporleur'sreport, consisting of "a description of the facts, procedure and grounds
of appeal and . .. a legal analysis of the case and an opinion on the
merits of the appeal"; 140 as well as (b) the draft judgments, of which
there may be several (in important cases).141 The parties, however,
never got meaningful access to these documents. Instead, prior to the
oral hearing, they received only the newly required summary annotations about the rapporteursposition and, at the oral hearing itself, the
first-and merely informational-part of the report.
The ECHR objected:
Given the importance of the reportingjudge's report (and in particular the second part thereof), the advocate-general's role and the
consequences of the outcome of the proceedings for Mrs. Reinhardt and Mr. Slimane-Kaid, the imbalance thus created by the failure to give like disclosure of the report to the applicants' advisers is
142
not reconcilable with the requirements of a fair trial.

Thus, even with its newly modified procedures, the Cour de cassation
still failed to satisfy the ECHR's fair trial requirements.
Of course, the Reinhardt decision could only spell doom for the
Conseil d'Etat's procedures, which had not been modified at all. Undoubtedly aware that it would soon find itself in the hot seat, the Conseil anticipated the ECHR's next move by rendering a powerful
decision on the fair trial issue only four months after the Reinhardt
decision. 143 Explaining in its inimitable way that the judicial amicus
in a Conseil d'Etat case, the CDG, 144 is, in fact, a judge who is a mem-

ber of the court itself, the Conseil concluded:
But considering that the commissaire du Gouvernement, whose
mission is to present the questions raised by each appeal and to
make known, by formulating his conclusions in total independence,
his assessment, which must be impartial, of the factual and legal
issues as well as his opinion on the solutions that, according to his
conscience, are called for by the case pending before the court of
138

139
140
141
142
143

144

See id. at 666.
See id. at 665.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 666.
See Esclatine, Conseil d'Etat, July 29, 1998, D. 1999, 85, concl. Chauvaux.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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which he is a member, pronounces his conclusions after the closure
of the instruction phase of the procedure, which is conducted in a
confrontational manner; considering that he participates in the
judging functions that devolve upon the court of which he is a member; that the exercise of this function is not subject to the principle
of confrontation applicable to the instruction phase; considering
that it follows that, no more than the Reporting Judge's note [i.e.,
the second part of his Report] or the draft judgment, the conclusions of the commissaire du Gouvernement-which furthermore need
not be reduced to writing-are not subject to prior communication
to the parties, who, furthermore, are not invited to respond to
145
them; [the appeal is therefore rejected].
As this passage makes quite clear-notwithstanding the grammatical constraints posed by the traditional French single-sentence judicial syllogism-the Conseil d'Etat refused to give quarter. Its response
to the ECHR's Borgersjurisprudence was to insist, as a categorical matter, that the CDG was in fact a judge; one who "participates in the
judging functions that devolve upon the court of which he is a member.1 46 As a member of the court, the CDG is not subject to confrontation, so his conclusions are neither distributed in advance to the
parties, nor subject to rebuttal. QED.
The Conseil d'Etat's hard line in Esclatine was further stressed by
the conclusions of the commissaire du Gouvernement in the case, Didier
Chauvaux. 147 In these conclusions, which were rather atypically published alongside the Conseil d'Etat's Esclatinejudgmentin the Recueil
Dalloz, Chauvaux put forward arguments that served as an anticipatory public brief in defense of the Conseil d'Etat's time-honored
procedures.
Chauvaux's arguments operated on two fronts: the categorical
and the pragmatic. On the categorical front, Chauvaux stressed the
position that the CDG is actually a member of the court. Thus, properly described and understood, argued Chauvaux, "the function [of a
CDG] is not truly distinguishable from that of a judge," despite the
fact that the CDG does not vote.1 48 He explained:
[The CDG] is a judicial magistrate who must come to a decision just as does any other judge, but who, instead of participating
in deliberations and voting, presents the elements of the litigation
to the other judges in the presence of the public.
145 See Esclatine, Conseil d'Etat, July 29, 1998, D. 1999, at 89 (translation by author).
This passage actually quotes heavily from the Conseil d'Etat's 1957 Gervaisedecision to the
same effect. See Conseil d'Etat, July 10, 1957, Rec. CE, p. 466.
146 Esclatine, Conseil d'Etat, July 29, 1998, D. 1999, at 89 (translation by author).
147
See id. Jur. 85, concl. Chauvaux.
148
Id. (translation by author).
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49

According to Chauvaux, the CDG intervenes after the adversarial
phase of the procedure, during which each party may confront all of
the evidentiary elements and legal arguments. His arguments are,
thus, part of the court's deliberations; they represent internal judicial
work in preparation of the court's judgment and are, therefore, not
subject to prior communication or partisan rebuttal.
On the pragmatic front, Chauvaux argued in two directions.
First, he decried the negative effects that would result from unwisely
subjecting the Conseil d'Etat's CDGs to the ECHR's Borgers line of jurisprudence. 150 For example, if the parties were invited to respond to
the CDG's conclusions, the oral arguments-which the CDG's intervention had closed-would suddenly be reopened, so the arguments
could continue ad infinitum.
Worse by far, however, would be the foolish extension of the Reinhardtjudgment's equal access doctrine. If the parties were entitled to
receive all of the same information as the CDG, then the CDG would
have to be removed from the inner workings of the court. 15 That is,
because the secrecy of judicial deliberations shields the sensitive sections of the rapporteurswork product (i.e., the second part of her report and the draft judicial decisions) from the public, the
requirement of equal access could only mean denying the CDG access
to these essential documents. The CDG would thus be frozen out of
his own court, killing the all-important internal dialogue between the
rapporteur, the CDG, and the rest of the sitting judicial panel.
Chauvaux lamented: "A communal form of work which has proven so
52
effective would thus be condemned."
Finally, Chauvaux made what can only be considered to be a
thinly veiled threat. Speaking to the Conseil d'Etat, though obviously
directing his remarks towards Strasbourg, he declared:
The paradox, furthermore, is that the CDG position could be
abolished entirely without violating any of the requirements that the
ECHR has deduced from Article 6 of the European Convention.
Your [i.e., the Conseil d'Etat's] public sessions would thus be limited to reading the submissions of the parties. The presentation
and analysis of each affair would then be made behind closed doors
[i.e., in chambers] by a Reporting Judge. But the parties and the
public would stand to gain nothing from such as system, which

149
150
151
152

Id.
See
See
Id.

(translation by author).
id.
id.
(translation by author).
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might well be the end result should the current procedural equilib5
rium be put into question.1 3
In this wily passage, which raises fascinating substantive and policy claims soon to be discussed in further detail, Chauvaux moved into
the realm of realpolitik. He put the ECHR on notice that extending
its Borgersjurisprudence to the Conseil d'Etat could result in a net loss
for the very policies that jurisprudence seeks to promote. In particular, the Conseil could very well respond by adopting tactically driven
procedural options that would effectively gut the ECHR's requirements while nominally satisfying them. Abolishing the CDG position,
for example, would simply drive all meaningful discussion underground, leaving the parties even more completely out of the argumentative loop.
Faced with this crafty, unyielding, and even vaguely threatening
resistance by the Conseil d'Etat and its CDG, the ECHR flinched in
Kress v. France.15 4 On the one hand, the ECHR extended its Borgers
jurisprudence in Kress by condemning the CDG's "participation in the
deliberations of the trial bench." 155 The ECHR rejected the French
contention that the CDG is "a full member of the trial bench, on
which he functions, in a manner of speaking, like a second Reporting
Judge."' 56 The Court reasoned that the CDG could not truly be a
judge, because "a judge cannot abstain from voting unless he stands
down[, ] ... [and] it is hard to accept the idea that some judges may
express their views in public while the others may do so only during
57
secret deliberations."'
Furthermore, argued the ECHR, "the doctrine of appearances
must also come into play."1 58 The Court explained:
In publicly expressing his opinion on the rejection or acceptance of the grounds submitted by one of the parties, the [CDG]
could legitimately be regarded by the parties as taking sides with
one or other of them.
In the Court's view, a litigant not familiar with the mysteries of
[French] administrative proceedings may quite naturally be inclined to view as an adversary a [CDG] who submits that his appeal
on points of law should be dismissed. Conversely, a litigant whose
case is supported by the [CDG] would see him as his ally.
The Court can also imagine that a party may have a feeling of
inequality if, after hearing the [CDG] make submissions unfavourable to his case at the end of the public hearing, he sees him

154
155

Id.
2001-VT Eur Ct. H.R. 1.
Id. at 72.

156

Id. at 70.

157

Id.

158

Id. at 71.

153
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withdraw with the judges of the trial bench to attend the deliberations held in the privacy of chambers (see, mutatis mutandis, Delcourt
.... pp. 16-17, § 30).159
The ECHR thus concluded that the CDG was not "truly a judge" to
begin with, certainly did not look like one to the uninitiated, and,
therefore, could no longer be allowed to attend or participate in
deliberations.
On the other hand, the ECHR was apparently unwilling to take
this holding to what one might consider to be its logical conclusion: to
recognize the right of parties to stand on equal procedural footing
with the CDG. Far from requiring that the parties receive (a) the
same access as the CDG to the rapporteur'swork product; (b) significant prior access to the CDG's conclusions; and/or (c) a full opportunity to respond to the CDG's oral arguments, the ECHR actually
signed off on the rest of the Conseil d'Etat's procedures. In a whitewashing passage that seeks-unconvincingly-to distinguish certain
elements of the Conseil d'Etat's procedures from their Cour de cassation equivalents, the Strasbourg Court reasoned:
Contrary to the position in Reinhardtand Slimane-Kaid, it is not
disputed that in proceedings in the Conseil d'Etat lawyers who so
wish can ask tie [CDG], before the hearing, to indicate the general
tenor of his submissions. Nor is it contested that the parties may
reply to the [CDG's] submissions by means of a memorandum for
the deliberations, a practice which-and this is vital in the Court's
view-helps to ensure compliance with the adversarial principle

That being so, the Court considers that the procedure followed
in the Conseil d'Etataffords litigants sufficient safeguards and that no
problem arises from the point of view of the right to a fair trial as
regards compliance with the principle that proceedings should be
adversarial.
There has consequently been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention in this respect. 160
In other words, the ECHR gave a clean bill of health to most of
the Conseil d'Etat's procedures, despite the fact that they were not
significantly distinguishable from the modified procedures the Cour
de cassation deployed. As a result, the ECHR's Kress decision-for all
the uproar it has raised in French legal circles for condemning the

159

Id. at 71.

160

Id. at 69.
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CDG's role in deliberations-has legitimately, if perhaps generously,
been described as "Solomonic."' 16
C.

Splitting the Pear (or the Baby?) in Two, Again and Again

Having presented the most importantjudgments in this doctrinal
area, it is worth taking a moment to recognize the desultory and uncommitted dynamic of the ongoing exchange between the plaintiffs,
the ECHR, and the French supreme courts. All of the players in this
extended saga have repeatedly pulled punches, given halfhearted responses, and offered or accepted disingenuous solutions.
Take the plaintiffs' demands: The more one takes them seriously,
the more it becomes obvious that, even if satisfied, the solutions would
still only amount to half-measures. What is it, after all, that plaintiffs
are seeking in the Borgers line of litigation? First, they seek access to
certain debates that have traditionally occurred within French-inspired
judicial systems. Accordingly, the plaintiffs have repeatedly sought significant prior access to the arguments and conclusions generated by
various judicial amici, such as the Belgian procureur gnjral and the
French advocate general or CDG. To a more limited extent, the
French plaintiffs have also sought access to the same internal documents as are provided to the judicial amicus, namely the second half
of the rapporteui's report and her draft judicial decision(s). 162 But
surely these plaintiffs have never seriously believed that they would
gain access to such documents, for what court ever divulges the bench
memoranda and draft decisions produced in preparation of judgment? Thus, it seems that this insistence upon receiving the more
sensitive and analytical sections of the rapporteui's written work product must be a ploy.
Certainly, the plaintiffs' real purpose in the Borgers line of litigation-other than finding a way to overturn unfavorable decisions in
their particular cases-must have been to ensure that parties before
the French-style supreme courts would have the opportunity to argue
fully and meaningfully before the sitting judicial panel. But if such is
the case, then why not altogether eliminate the all-important-but intentionally inaccessible-pr-oral argument judicial deliberations that
characterize the French procedural model? Might not the primary
problem be that, through an elaborate and protracted set of internal
judicial discussions, the French model is designed to generate one or
more draft judicial decisions before the case even goes to oral
argument?
161
See Le Conseil d'Etat francais et la Convention europgenne des droits de lhomme, CEDH,
June 7, 2001, D 2001, note Drago 2619.
162
See, e.g., Reinhardt and Slimane-Kaid v. France, 1998-11 Eur Ct. H.R. 640, 666.
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Moreover, if the idea is to provide the parties access to, use of,
and a fighting chance against the important arguments that traditionally take place within the judicial apparatus, then why not insist on
changes that might truly make a major argumentative difference for
the litigating public? Why not, for example, require discursive judicial
decisions, rather than the typically cryptic, formulaic, and syllogistic
decisions that typify the French appellate tradition? Or furthermore,
why not insist on individually signed judicial opinions, complete with
concurrences and dissents? In short, why focus on providing the individual parties' attorneys individual and personal access to certain internal judicial arguments, rather than requiring that such arguments be
made available to all through publication of discursive judicial decisions? Any or all of these modifications would-one might thinkgive the litigating public an infinitely clearer idea of what arguments
to press before which judges in what kind of a case; but almost none
of these more serious and comprehensive proposals were ever put on
the table.
Despite the limited nature of the plaintiffs' requests, and notwithstanding the limited nature of the ECHR's initial rulings-which, in
cases such as Borgers, Vermeulen, and Lobo Machado, did little more than
require that parties be able to respond to the judicial amicus, who
could no longer attend deliberations-the French reacted with halfhearted defensive measures intended to preempt successful challenges in the future. As we have seen, the French merely pointed to
some preexisting professional courtesies and threw together some mi163
nor procedural modifications.
Anyone versed in French supreme court procedure should immediately recognize that these prophylactic procedural adjustments were
half-measures, the real purpose of which was to salvage as much of the
French judicial corps's traditionally extensive and protected internal
debates as possible. First, the French procedures continued to permit
the rapporteur to grant the judicial amicus privileged access to her
work product (including, most importantly, her draft judicial decisions and the second part of her report). Second, the preemptive
French measures never questioned the continued presence of the judicial amicus in deliberations. In fact, not only did the French measures not remove the advocate general or CDG from the
tremendously important pre-oral argument deliberations internal to
the Cour de cassation and Conseil d'Etat, but these measures did not
even remove the amici from the post-oral argument deliberations, as
the Borgers and Vermeulen decisions clearly demanded. 164 Remarkably,
See supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
See Borgers v. Belgium, 214 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) 22, 32; Vermeulen v. Belgium,
1996-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 224, 234.
163
164
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even after the ECHR's Reinhardt judgment condemned the advocate
general's continued presence or participation in the French Cour de
cassation's post-oral argument deliberations, 65 the Conseil d'Etat still
refused to remove its CDGs from its own deliberations.
And yet, perhaps appropriately, the Strasbourg Court's responses
to these French half-measures were half-baked in their own right, as
the Kress decision demonstrates quite nicely. On the one hand, the
ECHR signed off on a number of the makeshift French solutions, including, inter alia, the limited advance notice to parties of the rapporteur's and judicial amicus's respective positions and the parties'
limited ability to respond to the amicus's oral arguments. 166 On the
other hand, however, the ECHR continued to condemn the judicial
arnicus's presence in post-oral argument judicial deliberations and,
perhaps, the unequal access afforded parties to the rapporteur'swork
67
product (though only at the Cour de cassation).1
Thus, at every stage, half-hearted demands, responses, judgments,
adjustments, and the like have characterized these ongoing disputes
before the ECHR and French supreme courts. Having traced this
long and winding series of half-measures, which runs from the
ECHR's Borgers decision through its Kress decision, the time has come
for some assessment.
III
FREEZE FRAME: COSTS AND BENEFITS

As should be increasingly apparent, a cost-benefit analysis of the
Borgersjurisprudence at the outcome of the Kress litigation yields decidedly uninspiring results in the context of the French supreme
courts. The plaintiffs' hard-fought victories have actually been quite
minor. But the costs-not only for the French courts but also for the
ECHR itself-have been extremely high.
A.

Benefits

To begin, what exactly have parties before the French supreme
courts actually gained? Three victories are apparent: (1) in some instances, the procedural right to receive some form of advance notification of the positions taken by the two important French magistratsthe rapporteur and the judicial amicus; (2) the right to respond, in
some way, to the amicus's oral arguments; and (3) what amount to
negative rights regarding the amicus, namely, that he not receive privileged access to the rapporteur'scomplete work product and that he not
165
166
167

See Reinhardt, 1998-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 657, 665.
See Kress v. France, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 68-69.
See Reinhardt, 1998-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 666.
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be able to participate in post-oral argumentjudicial deliberations. Let
us take a closer look at these three hard-fought victories.
1.

The Right to Advance Notice of the Magistrats' Arguments

Parties before the French supreme courts have gained limited
rights to receive some form of advance notification of the positions
taken by the rapporteurand the judicial amicus. But what kind of information are the parties to receive, from whom, and when? The
Conseil d'Etat, for its part, simply refused to make any concessions.1 68
Instead, the Conseil merely stressed that its existing practice permitted the members of the specialized supreme court bar to request that
the judicial amicus inform them of the general tenor of his or her
intended submissions. 169 - Despite this refusal to budge, the ECHR
nonetheless upheld these existing procedures. 170 Thus, parties appearing before the Conseil d'Etat have gained nothing at all.
On the other hand, the Cour de cassation demonstrated a willingness to make certain conciliatory gestures. In response to the Borgers
and Vermeulen decisions, the Cour thus built upon the Conseil d'Etat's
practice of allowing counsel to learn the gist of the judicial amicus's
position by also requiring the rapporteurto give a summary indication
71
of his position.'
But what advantage might parties gain by having access to such
limited information? Frankly, not much. The most the parties can
learn is (1) whether the rapporteurhas already written a report in favor
or against cassation, in whole or in part; and (2) the gist of the armicus's position. The former piece of information is essentially useless,
because it gives no substantive explanation for the rapporteuwr's position. At best, it gives an attorney the chance to handicap his case; as
the member of the sitting judicial panel with the best knowledge of
the case, the rapporteurobviously carries significant influence. The latter information is not significantly more helpful, as the Advocate General or CDG must only convey the "tenor" of his arguments, not the
arguments themselves. Needless to say, such summary information
can only be of limited use.
At least as important as the tremendously limited nature of the
information available to the parties about the magistrats' respective positions is the issue of when the parties actually receive that shorthand
information. The rapporteur'sannotation appears with the list of cases
to be argued the following week before the Cour de cassation, and the
amicus need only convey the gist of his position the day before oral
168
169
170

171

See supra notes 144-53 and accompanying text.
See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra notes 45 and 50 and accompanying text.
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arguments.' 72 Needless to say, such limited advance notice hardly affords the attorneys much time to rethink and recast their positions
before oral arguments, but this may be the least of the problem.
Infinitely more damaging is the fact that the parties will not have
had the opportunity to rework their written submissions. After all, the
French legal system-whether in its private law, administrative law, or
constitutional law variants-is overwhelmingly oriented towards written, as opposed to oral, procedure. 173 For the two French magistratsto
release such limited information so late in the day therefore deprives
the attorneys of the opportunity to recast the all-important written
pleadings that they submit to the French supreme courts.
2.

The Right to Respond to the Amicus's Arguments

The significance of this insight into the realities of French legal
argumentation only becomes fully apparent when one considers the
second victory parties apparently gained in the Borgers line of litigation: the right to respond to the amicus's oral arguments, either
orally or by submitting a written note in deliberations. At first blush,
this "right" appears to be a major concession by the French to the
ECHR; but anyone versed in the traditional operation of French appellate procedure should immediately recognize that-at least at this
point in time-this concession likely represents little more than an
empty formality.
Why does this French concession turn out to be almost no concession at all? Because French supreme court attorneys actually make
oral arguments in less than one out of every hundred cases before the Cour
de cassation and the Conseil d'Etat.' 74 The reasons for this state of
affairs should be increasingly obvious to the reader. First, as just explained, and as is characteristic of civilian systems generally, French
See Reinhardt, 1998-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 655-56.
See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Envisioninga Global Legal Culture, 25 MicH. J. INT'L L. 1, 63
(2003) ("The civil law depends much more [than the common law] on writing.").
Thus, to convey that they belong to a civil law country, French jurists tend to say that
they belong to a "country of written law" (pays de droit ecrit). See, e.g., L'impartialitedujuge,
entre apparence et rialit, D 2001 Chron. 2427 note Beignier and Blery; Le commissaire du
Gouvernement pros le Conseil dEtat et l'article 6 §1 de la Convention europlenne des droits de
l'homme, D 2001 Chron. 1188, Andriantsimbazovina. For a strong defense of the superiority
of written versus oral procedure in the Borgers context, see Le Conmissaire du gouvernement
repecte Msprincipe du contradictoire. Mieux, il l'approfondit, Gaz. Pal., 1998, Doct. 183, note
Libert.
174
See interview with Guy Canivet, Premier Prdsident de la Cour de cassation, in Paris,
France (June 25, 2003); interview with Marie-Aimee Latournerie, Conseiller d'Etat, in
Paris, France (June 26, 2003); MARIE-NOfLLEJOBARD-BACHELLIER ET XAVIER BACIIELLIER, LA
TECHNIQUE DE CASSATION; PouRvois ET ARRt-TS EN MATItRE CIVILE 15 (5th ed. 2003) (explaining the paucity of partisan oral argument at the French Cour de cassation on the
grounds that "procedure being written, attorneys rarely plead, although they may request
to do so in cases of first impression") (translation by author).
172

173
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procedure is traditionally written in orientation.1 75 Therefore, almost
by definition, serious argument means written argument. Given that
written pleadings traditionally dominate French appellate procedure,
oral arguments wither, especially at the highest, most technical, and
most professionally advanced levels (i.e., before the French supreme
courts).
The second reason for this paucity of partisan oral arguments becomes apparent as one considers the full scope of the pre-oral argument deliberations that occur within the French judicial corps. As we
have seen, long before oral arguments by the parties ever take place,
the rapporteur produces and distributes her report, which is often
thirty to fifty pages long. This report not only summarizes the factual
and procedural history of the case and the parties' respective pleadings, but also presents the rapporteursown detailed analysis of the relevant statutory, judicial, and academic materials and offers and justifies
her proposed solution. In addition, of course, the rappoteurproduces
one or more draft judicial decisions, which she distributes to her
brethren along with the report.
Furthermore, the rapporteur'sdetailed and influential work product hardly represents the totality of the preparatory deliberative effort
performed by members of the Cour de cassation and Conseil d'Etat.
Instead, this work product forms but one-albeit very important-element of the elaborate judicial deliberations that occur internally prior
to oral argument in a given case. Here, for example, is the ECHR's
description of the procedure the Conseil d'Etat follows once the rapporteurdistributes her report and draft judgment(s):
The file subsequently goes to the reviser, an office assumed in each
section by the president or one of the other two assesseurs [supreme
court judges] constituting the bench. The reviser re-examines the
evidence and forms a view as to how the case should be decided. He
may himself prepare another draft decision in the event of disagreement with the reporting judge. Once the draft decision has been
revised, the case is listed for consideration at a preparatory sitting of
the section, at which it will be discussed in the presence of the
[CDG], who does not, however, take part in the vote on the draft.
Only when the draft decision has been adopted by the section will
the file be forwarded to the [CDG] to enable him either to prepare

his submissions or to ask for a fresh preparatory sitting to be convened or for the case to be transferred to a differently constituted
court.
...
When [the CDG's] view of a case differs from that of the
section, he can come and discuss it with the section at another pre-

175

See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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paratory sitting. If the disagreement remains and he considers that
the case is of sufficient importance, he has the right (rarely exercised in practice) to request that the case should be referred to the
Judicial Division or to the Judicial Assembly. Only after that will he
prepare his submissions for the actual trial, which is open to the
public.'

76

Given these remarkably long, detailed, and communal preparatory judicial procedures, it should no longer come as a surprise that
parties would rarely request to present oral arguments at the French
supreme court level. After all, by the time oral arguments occur, the
judicial panel will have already received and actively discussed the rapporteur's report and, as is now apparent, will have often edited and
even provisionally adopted one of her draft judgments. For an attorney to request oral arguments is therefore vaguely frowned upon.
Such a request suggests that the attorney either failed to do his job
properly in the first place (i.e., when submitting his written pleadings), is presumptuously suggesting that the massive internal judicial
deliberations were somehow insufficient to flush out and consider the
alternative arguments, or, most likely, is simply engaging in last-minute grandstanding.
The ECHR-induced right of the parties to respond to the oral
arguments of the advocate general or CDG is thus a largely empty
formality. For a host of practical, professional, institutional, procedural, and cultural reasons, French supreme court attorneys almost
never present oral arguments to begin with. For all intents and purposes, therefore, it is of almost no consequence for the ECHR to provoke an apparent strengthening of this oral practice without
addressing the underlying reasons for which this oral practice is traditionally ignored in the first place.
3.

The Right to Limit the Amicus's Access to Deliberations

The plaintiffs' final victory-the negative right to cut off the judicial amicus's access to certain pre- and post-oral argument internal
judicial discussions-hardly represents a more significant achievement. After all, the whole reason the advocate general or CDG exists
is to provide the sitting judicial panel with an independent assessment
of the case at hand. 17 7 The advocate general, for example, argues on
behalf of the public welfare, society's interest, and the proper applica176

Kress v. France, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 54-55 (citations omitted). For the ECHR's

summary description of the Cour de cassation's parallel procedures, see Reinhardt and
Slimane-Kaid v. France, 1998-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 640, 655-56. For an unprecedented and eyeopening account of the internal workings of the Conseil d'Etat, see generally BRUNO LATOUR, LA FABRIQUE Du DROIT: UNE ETHNOGRAPHIE DU CONSEIL D'ETAT (2002).
177
See BELL, PRINCIPLES, supra note 20, at 58-59.
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tion of the law.178 Similarly, the CDG "formulat[es] his conclusions in
total independence, [offering] his assessment, which must be impartial, of the factual and legal issues as well as his opinion on the solutions that, according to his conscience, are called for by the case
pending before the court."179 In other words, the judicial arnicus is
just as likely to argue in favor of a given party's position as against it.
As a practical matter, to exclude the advocate general or CDG
from pre- or post-oral argument judicial deliberations, therefore, represents no victory at all for French supreme court litigants. Instead,
to do so merely alienates the amicus from the sitting judicial panel
without generating increased knowledge, information, or access for
the parties themselves. After all, no one could seriously believe that
the French supreme courts would be willing to open their internal
deliberations to the litigants or to the public in order to allow the
judicial amici to continue to attend.
B.

Costs

To make the decidedly meager omelet produced by its Borgers
line of jurisdiction, the ECHR has broken, or at least badly cracked, a
large number of eggs. To begin, the ECHR jurisprudence has imposed severe reputational costs on the French supreme courts and on
the French legal system generally. After all, this is not just a plain
vanilla, one-shot instance of the ECHR ruling that some substantive
position the French administration or French courts have taken-for
example, the banning of ostentatious religious symbols in schools or
the refusal to recognize sex changes-is incompatible with the European Convention. Such adverse substantive decisions, though undoubtedly an embarrassment, address relatively discrete positions or
practices that are somewhat easily severable from the rest of the legal,
political, and judicial systems.
The ECHR's Borgers line of decisions is another matter altogether.
These judgments inform the French that the very processes by which
they thought they were defending human and civil rights over the last
two hundred years actually, in and of themselves, violate those rights.
Needless to say, this is no small pill for the French to swallow. After
all, not only was France the country that produced the great revolutionary-era Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789,
but it also created and exported one of the earliest and most effective
forms of individual protection against illegal state action-the Napole-
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260 (3d ed. 1989).
See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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onic system of centralized administrative review, headed by the Conseil d'Etat.18 0
In short, the ECHRjurisprudence thus strikes not at mere French
substantive law but at the inner workings of the French judicial system
itself. The Borgers line of decisions confronts, and even condemns,
the very core of the French judicial system: the age-old methods by
which the highest levels of the French judiciary perform their essential functions. The Borgersjurisprudence thus casts a shadow over the
totality of French judicial decisionmaking, past and present.
Leaving aside the eminently practical and tremendously important issue of what such ECHR condemnation means for the legal effect of French supreme court judgments,1 8 1 the ECHR's
jurisprudence, therefore, undercuts the status and influence of the
traditional French model of judicial decisionmaking. Nowhere is this
more evident than on the international plane. Given that the French
model has influenced so much of Europe, including not only
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal,18 2 but also the European
Union's own Court of Justice, the legality of that French model is being called severely into question.
As a result, the Borgers jurisprudence compromises one of the
great symbols of French national pride: its significant international
legal legacy. 183 Furthermore, that jurisprudence also tarnishes a particularly cherished French national icon: the judicial amicus at the
Conseil d'Etat, the commissaire du Gouvernement. The CDG represents
one of the most potent French symbols of the rule of law. Thus, for
the ECHR to strike at the CDG is paradoxically to undermine an institution the French mind closely associates with the defense of civil liberties and, thus, to sully the cherished memory of that institution's
greatest names: Edouard Laferriere, Jean Romieu, and above all, the
184
legendary Leon Blum.
180 For an excellent presentation and assessment of the French administrative legal
system, see generally BROWN & BELL, supra note 4.
181 For example: Can other European national courts simply refuse to recognize these
judgments? What impact would the EU's incorporation and ratification of the European
Convention of Human Rights have on this question? Etc. For an extremely intriguing
analysis of the emerging European judicial treatment of procedural fairness issues, see
Horatia Muir Watt, Evidence of an EmergentEuropean Legal Culture:Public Policy Requirements of
ProceduralFairnessUnder the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, 36 TEx. INT'L L.J. 539 (2001).
182 The Borgers line of jurisprudence thus includes cases drawn from each of these
countries. For instance, Borgers and Vermeulen both examined Belgium's procedures,
whereas Lobo Machado condemned Portugal's. See also K.D.B. v. the Netherlands, 1998-Il
Eur. Ct. H.R. 620.
183
See, e.g.,OLMER DUTHEILLET DE LAMOTHE & MARIE-AIMfE LATOURNERIE,
LINFLUENCE INTERNATIONALE Du DROIT FRANCAs 54-57 (2001) (referring to "the influential [international) radiance of French administrative law").
184 As Jean-Paul Costa, the French vice president of the European Court of Human
Rights, recently explained, ChiefJustice Marshall would probably be the American judicial
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On a more immediately practical level, the ECHR's rulings stand
to significantly alter the French supreme courts' decisionmaking procedure, as these rulings threaten the judicial amicus with irrelevance,
if not extinction. That is, instead of engaging in an institutionally
privileged conversation with the courts-first with the rapporteur(and,
to some extent, with the rest of the sitting judicial panel) before oral
arguments, and then with the sitting panel in deliberations-the amicus might actually be removed from both of those special deliberative
sites.
For the French judiciary, such banishment of the judicial amicus
would mark a profound and disturbing change, striking precisely, if
perhaps unwittingly, at the core of the French system's guiding logic:
the judicial control and legitimacy produced by institutional educa1 85
tion, training, meritocracy, hierarchy, teamwork, and expertise.
First, this banishment would damage the depth, frankness, and quality
of the internal French judicial debates. After all, to the extent that
the amicus could no longer access the rapporteuws work product, an
entire slice-and traditionally, probably the single most important
and substantive slice-of the internal judicial debates stands to be lost
altogether. Moreover, this says nothing about the very real problem,
stressed by the Cour de cassation's advocates general, that without access to the rapporteurspreparatory work, the advocate general would
have to start his or her research into each case from scratch. 18 6 The
small corps of advocates general is institutionally incapable of han18 7
dling this highly inefficient replication of work.
Secondly, banishing the judicial amicus would significantly interfere with the all-important French meritocratic institutional hierarchy."8 The key to understanding this institutional dimension of the
issue is to recognize that the CDGs, for example, are the cr'me de la
cr~Me of the young members of the Conseil d'Etat itself. In fact, these
judicial amici are the Conseil's young stars, who perform the amicus
function for a couple of years as a particularly prestigious initial experience in intellectual and institutional leadership.' 8 9
figure that most closely approximates the iconographic status of Lbon Blum. Interview
with Jean-Paul Costa, Vice-President, European Court of Human Rights, in Strasbourg,
France Uune 16, 2003).
See supra Part I.
185
See Rgis de Gouttes, Les ambivalences de lajurisprudence e la Coureuropennedes droits
186
de l'Homme en 2001, in AcrES DE LA HUITItME SESSION D'INFORMATION (ARRtTS RENDUS EN
2001, CAH-ERS DU CREDHO, NO. 8), available at http://www.credho.org/cedh/session08/
session08-02-01.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2005). Mr. de Gouttes is one of the two Chief
Advocates General (Premiers Avocats gfnLraux) of the Cour de cassation. See id.
187

See id.

See supra Part I.B.6.
Interview with Guy Braibant, Conseiller d'Etat, in Paris, France (June 25, 2003);
interview with Latournerie, supra note 174; interview with Vice President Costa, supranote
188
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Thus, to remove the judicial amicus from both pre- and post- oral
argument deliberations would amount to alienatingthese future judicial leaders from the rest of their own judicial institutions, thereby
stunting their institutional training and formation, lowering the shortand long-term quality of internal judicial deliberations, and subverting the all-important republican and institutional bases of French
judicial control and legitimacy. In other words, the potential banishment of the judicial amicus threatens irreparable harm to the traditional working methods, training system, and corps identity of the
French supreme courts. Not only would the most promising young
members of the Conseil d'Etat no longer perform a privileged role
within the Conseil's internal deliberations, but unlike all other members of the tribunal, they would be barred altogether from attending-and learning from-those internal deliberations.
As a result, the ECHR's challenge to the French supreme courts'
traditional procedural and institutional structures in the Borgersjurisprudence has hardly endeared the Strasbourg Court to French jurists.
That jurisprudence not only posed practical problems regarding the
daily operation of the upper reaches of the French judiciary, but it
also struck at highly emblematic and revered French institutions. Indeed, one would be hard pressed to come up with two institutions that
lie closer to the core of the French state and its self-conception than
the Conseil d'Etat (the conscience of the French State) and the Cour
de cassation (the ultimate interpreter of the Civil Code).
One must therefore recognize the considerable hostility engendered by the Borgers line of decisions as a significant cost. With every
new ECHR judgment, the French doctrinal outcry only grew more
strident. By the time of the Kress decision, French academics were
publishing highly visible articles with such tides as "Knowing is Nothing, Imagining is Everything: A Free Conversation about the ECHR's
Kress Decision"' 190 and "Should the European Court of Human Rights
be Abolished?"191
Although a serious discussion of the implications of these French
critiques will have to wait until Part V of this Article, it is worth noting
the tenor of such commentaries at this point. The outrage the Borgers
jurisprudence provoked and the resulting scorn French commentators heaped upon the ECHR not only make for highly entertaining
reading, but also indicate that the Borgersjurisprudence undoubtedly
184; see also

ANTOINE GARAPON

& IOANNIS PAPADOPOULOS, JUcER EN AMERIQUE ET EN

(2004) (speaking of the
"formation" of young members of the Conseil d'Etat).
190
See Joel Andriantsimbazovina, "Savoir n'est rien, imaginer est tout: Libre conversation
autour de l'arrtKress de la Cour europgenne des droits de l'homrne, D. 2001, Chron. 2611.
191
See Victor Haim, Faut-il supprimer Ia Cour europienne des droits de 'homme ?, D. 2001,
Chron. 2988.
FRANCE: CULTURE JURIDIQUE FRANCAISE ET COMMON LAw 111-12
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entails a certain loss of ECHR credibility within the French legal
community.
In the following passage, for example, Professor Victor Haim
makes no attempt to hide his contempt:
That said, notwithstanding the fact that the CDG is a member
of the tribunal to which he presents his conclusions, would it not be
preferable that his conclusions be obligatorily communicated to the
parties, who could therefore respond to them?
This is a claim that is no longer rare to make, usually on the
basis of deeply flawed reasoning. Clearly, there would be something
pleasant about adopting such a stance: now that participation and
interactivity are all the rage, the parties would be able to participate
in the elaboration, and why not even in the composition, of the
judgments in their own cases. Just as there exist such toys as "the
book in which you are the hero" for ten to twelve year-olds, there
could exist for somewhat older ones "the judicial decision adopted
92
in view of your own conclusions along with those of the CDG."'
Commenting on the ECHR's Voisine decision,' 9 Jean Thierry, HonoraryJustice of the Cour de cassation, is hardly less dismissive:
It is important to note that the ECHR abandons in its Voisine
decision the reasoning of its Borgers decision, according to which,

"by recommending in favor or against the appeal of an accused,"
the Advocate General thereby "becomes his objective ally or opponent." According to such reasoning, the Cour de cassation, when it
rejects the appeal of an accused, would also become his objective
194
opponent, which is simply absurd.
Though it goes without saying that screams of "bloody murder" typically accompany any international condemnation of national pracices, this line of French academic responses adopts a somewhat
different-and perhaps even more damaging-stance. That is, a long
list of widely respected French commentators were willing to treat the
ECHR's jurisprudence as plainly ridiculous.
That said, the French have fully understood that the Borgers line
of decisions represents a very real and imminent threat to the traditional French approach to judicial decisionmaking, a threat the
French simply lack the power to resist. Thus ProfessorJoOl Andriantsimbazovina, summarizing and assessing the Kress claims, decries:
There is nothing really new [about the Kress claims]. These argu-

ments sum up the ECHRjurisprudence regarding the principle of
equality of arms and the principle of confrontation. And in the face
See Victor Haim, Le commissaire du gouvernement et le respect du contradictoire,D. 1999,
192
Chron. 201 (translation by author).
193 See Voisine v. France, CEDH, Feb. 8, 2000, D. 2000, 651, note Thierry.
194 Id. at 653 (citations omitted) (translation by, author).
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of the relentless advance of this steamroller, the attempt to remove
the CDG's conclusions from the application of article 6-1 of the European Convention amounts to a rearguard action .... One could
well say that this appears to be no more than the chronicle of a
19 5
predetermined submission (to the ECHR].
The ECHR thus comes off quite often in the French commentary as a
misguided, yet unstoppable, destructive force.
Needless to say, such a perception actively damages the ECHR's
overall effectiveness. Like all systems of international law, the Council
of Europe's human rights regime requires a significant dose of goodwill and cooperation to operate effectively. 196 In a slightly different
context, Joseph Weiler has convincingly argued that the unusual penetration of the European Union's legal system into the national legal
systems of its constituent member states has hinged-and continues
to hinge-precisely on the EU's ability to enlist the national courts to
act cooperatively as the first and most important line of application of
EU law. 19 7 Consequently, for the ECHR to alienate the French judiciary compromises the very effectiveness of the ECHR system in general,
as the ECHR itself can only oversee a tiny fraction of human rights
claims.
Of course, any international system of human rights protection
worthy of the title must, by its very nature, be willing to render judgments that will be embarrassing and unpopular on the national level.
But as we have seen, the Borgersjurisprudence is unusually delicate in
this regard, as it does not merely condemn some particular substantive law, governmental policy, or judicial position. Instead, it condemns the very processes and traditions by which the judiciary itself
operates. The Borgers line of case law directly and concertedly attacks
precisely the institutions upon which the ECHR relies the most: the
national courts.
As a result, the collateral costs of disrupting and antagonizing the
French supreme courts in this way could prove to be quite significant,
most likely taking the form of French judicial foot-dragging or
unenthusiastic cooperation, if not overt resistance. By menacing the
high French judiciary, the Borgers jurisprudence thus threatens to
alienate a traditionally strong ally and a particularly important vector
195

Andriantsimbazovina, supra note 190 (translation by author).

196

SeeJANiS ET AL., supra note 12, at 86 (remarking that "most meaningful enforce-

ment of Strasbourg's substantive law must take place before national courts"). For the now
canonical analysis of the reasons for which nations comply or cooperate with international
law, see Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599
(1997) (book review).
197
SeeJ.H.H. WEILER,
EMPEROR?
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27-29, 192-97 (1999).
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for the effective judicial enforcement of the European human rights
system.
Furthermore, because what is at stake in these cases is not only
French judicial procedure, but also the highly influential French model
ofjudicial decisionmaking, the potential damage is far greater. First,
the Borgers line of decisions threatens, inter alia, the Belgian, Dutch,
Portuguese, and French supreme courts, to say nothing of the European Court of Justice. Second, and perhaps as a result, the divisions
created within the European Court of Human Rights itself have been
deep, vocal, and, frankly, nasty. For example, the Kress decision,
which condemned the Conseil d'Etat's procedures, was decided by a
margin of ten votes to seven.""' This unusually close vote prompted
all seven dissenting judges to sign onto a particularly vehement opinion about the illegitimacy of the majority's actions. 199
In fact, the depth of the cleavage within the ECHR was so great
that the dissent deployed tellingly blunt and disrespectful language to
express its disagreement with the majority-language sufficiently atypical that it is worth quoting at some length:
5. In its first argument, set out in paragraph 79 of the judgment, the majority of the Court criticise the fact that the [CDG]
participates in the deliberations without voting. That argument
strikes us as being paradoxical. Would amending the rules to provide that the [CDG] votes on the draft judgment really be sufficient
for his attendance at the deliberations to be given the Court's blessing? Secondly, the last sentence of paragraph 79 adds that all
judges must express their views in public-or none must. But that
statement, which begs the question, is not based on any precedent
of our Court and is not founded on any authoritative argument. It is
an affirmation pure and simple, and is scarcely persuasive.
6. The second argument rests, in our view, on a false symmetry
....
The majority of the Court infer that a litigant should enjoy
similar [procedural] safeguards in respect of the deliberations. Yes,
but what does that mean? That the private party's lawyer, or the
representative of the administrative authority in dispute with that
party, or both, should also attend the deliberations? They would be
silent and passive, as the [CDG] is, and yet their presence would
neutralise his own? Merely to imagine such possibilities is to demonstrate how unrealistic they are. We therefore consider that this argument is ingenious but contrived.
7. The Court's third argument is based on the doctrine of appearances. According to that doctrine, justice must be seen to be
done impartially (even though neither the applicant nor the Court
198 See Kress v. France, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 75 (Wildhaber, Costa, Pastor Ridruejo,
Kfiris, Birsan, Botoucharova, and Ugrekhelidze, JJ., partly dissenting).
199 See id. at 77-80.
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itself has ever cast doubt on the independence or impartiality of the
[CDG] or of similar institutions at supreme courts . . .).
8. Many authors and even eminent judges of this Court have
written that the doctrine of appearances, which is in any case not
accepted to the same extent in all the legal systems represented in
the Council of Europe, has in the past been pushed much too far,
whether vis-d-vis the Court of Cassation in Belgium or France, the
Supreme Court in Portugal or the Supreme Court of the Netherlands. Despite those criticisms, the majority go further still. It is illogical that the same applicant, who in no way calls in question the
subjective impartiality of a judge or his independence may justifiably "have a feeling of inequality" if she sees him "withdraw with the
judges of the trial bench to attend the deliberations held in the privacy of chambers." It is not only illogical; it is open to criticism,
since any informed litigant, and at all events any informed lawyer,
knows that the participation in the deliberations of someone who
has publicly expressed his "opiniojuris"is not, by the mere fact of his
presence, going to increase the impact of that opinion on the
judges who have to deliberate and vote. To hold any differently
would be to insult the latter and impute to them a lack of independence and impartiality.
13. [I]t would be desirable, in our view, that the Court should
review the whole of its case-law on proceedings in supreme courts in
Europe, case-law which places too much emphasis on appearances,
to the detriment of respectable national traditions and, ultimately,
200
of litigants' real interests.
As one may readily surmise, the Borgers jurisprudence is so divisive
within the ECHR precisely because it attacks a readily identifiable bloc
of historically interconnected national courts whose traditional judicial procedures stand to be steamrolled by the ECHR majority.
Finally, and perhaps most problematically, the Borgers jurisprudence has established an ongoing and unhealthy dynamic of fearful
resistance by the affected legal systems. Attempting to escape the full
brunt of the ECHR's decisions, each of the challenged judicial systems
has tried desperately to distinguish itself from the others. Indeed,
even the ECHR has recognized this defensive tactical dynamic. In response to the latest such attempt by France, the Strasbourg Court
remarked:
67. [The ECHRI observes that since Borgers ... all the governments have endeavoured to show before the Court that in their legal systems their advocates-general or principal State counsel were
different from the Belgian procureurgdneral, from the point of view
200
Id. at 77-80 (Wildhaber, Costa, Pastor Ridruejo, Kia-is, Birsan, Botoucharova, and
Ugrekhelidze, JJ., partly dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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both of organisation and of function. Their role was said, for instance, to differ according to the nature of the proceedings (criminal, civil or even disciplinary); they were said not to be parties to the
proceedings or the adversaries of anyone; their independence was
said to be guaranteed and their role limited to that of an amicus
curiae acting in the public interest or to ensure that case-law was
consistent.
68. The Government [of France is] no exception. [It] too
maintained that the institution of [the CDG] in French administrative proceedings differed from the other institutions criticised in
the judgments cited above .... 201

The ECHR has thus acknowledged this all-too-obvious pattern of attempted "resistance by distinction," but has apparently chosen to
brush it off in a rather dismissive manner.
Ever alert to the resulting difficulty of successfully distinguishing
their supreme court practices from those the ECHR has already condemned, the French have responded with assorted half-hearted procedural adjustments, launching the next in its ongoing series of interjudicial parries and thrusts. But even this unseemly-and largely unproductive-pattern of half-measures does not fully capture the degree of insincere, self-serving, and ultimately destructive
argumentation the ECHR's decisions have provoked.
Once the ECHR added the French Cour de cassation to its growing list of supreme courts whose traditional procedures violated Article 6(1) of the European Convention, it was only a matter of time
before the Conseil d'Etat would find itself on the block. At that juncture, the Conseil and its supporters felt compelled to adopt a thoroughly understandable-but nonetheless highly distasteful-tactic:
They abandoned the Cour de cassation altogether. In the wake of the
Reinhardt decision condemning the Cour de cassation, French legal
commentary suddenly brimmed with arguments about why the Conseil d'Etat's CDGs-unlike the Cour de cassation's advocates generalreally do function as fully independent judicial amici.
In a typical example, Professor Victor Haim thus argued:
Today, it is no longer possible even to conceive of analogizing
the CDG and the ministre public [i.e., the corps of Advocates General before the regular courts, headed by the Cour de cassation].
First of all, the ministire public is composed of judicial magistrates who, just like the sitting judges, belong to the judicial corps,
but who nevertheless differ from them in every way: they are not
immovable, they are subject to a different disciplinary system, and
even if "they have freedom of speech at oral arguments," it nonetheless remains the case that they exercise their functions "under the
201

Id. at 67.
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direction and control of their hierarchical superiors and under the
authority of the Minister of Justice." Nothing comparable exists at
the Conseil d'Etat .... 202
Making much of the fact that the CDG is but another "internal" member of the Conseil d'Etat, Professor Haim all but applauds the ECHR's
condemnation of the Cour de cassation:
But what if the court's internal documents are only made externally available in a selective fashion? What if thejudge lends, to one
of the parties, a helping hand-one full of notes, texts and documents that tend to grant that party a certain advantage over his adversary? In such a case, the procedure will have been irregular and
the judgment defective. On this point, one can only be in agreement with the reasoning of the Strasbourg Court. Such is precisely
the case for the [Advocate General of the Cour de cassation], who
alone receives a copy of the [second part ofl of the Reporting
Judge's Report as well as the draft judgment that he has
20 3
composed.
Haim thus bolsters his defense of the Conseil d'Etat by signing onto
the ECHR's condemnation of the Cour de cassation.
Such disloyal breaking of ranks within the French camp has by no
means been limited to academics. Thus, in the Conseil d'Etat's Esclatine case-which, as we have seen, functioned as an anticipatory public
defense of the Conseil d'Etat's procedures 204 -CDG
Chauvaux followed the same basic line of reasoning. Arguing that the CDG is a
judicial member of the Conseil d'Etat panel that handles a given case,
Chauvaux publicly abandoned the Cour de cassation in a desperate
attempt to distinguish the Conseil's working methods from those condemned by the ECHR:
In this respect, the CDG's position differs clearly from that of the
Advocates General at the Cour de cassation. The Advocates General are not members of the Cour. They belong to the ministerepublic attached to the Cour and are placed under the authority of the
procureurgnral. By virtue of Art. R. 132-1 of the Code of Judicial
Organization, they exercise their functions under the direction of
the procureur gbnraL Although a perpetually respected tradition
holds that their independence be respected, Art. R. 132-3 calls for
the Advocate General, in important cases, to forward his conclusions to the procureurg4n ral who, if he does not approve of them,
can designate another Advocate General or take the floor himself at
oral arguments.
202
Haim, supranote 192 (citations omitted). See also Andriantsimbazovina, supra note
190 ("The Advocate General can be considered comparable to a party to the case, but the
CDG cannot.")
203
Haim, supra note 192.
204
See supra notes 143-53 and accompanying text.
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These characteristics are not to be found [at the Conseil
d'Etat]. The CDG is placed in a situation analogous to all the other
members of the tribunal. His position is similar to that of the Reporting Judge, except that he expresses himself in public and then
does not vote. His functions could thus be defined as those of a
public Reporting Judge. This is what explains and legitimates his
participation with the judges in all the successive stages of the 20pro5
cedure, from the preparatory phase to the final deliberations.
CDG Chauvaux thus joined the Conseil's academic supporters in their
post-Reinhardt critiques of the Cour de cassation.
The ECHR's Borgersjurisprudence has thus provoked a cleavage
within French legal culture. To be sure, there had always existed a
complex series of turf-battles between the "ordinary" and "administrative" French courts; but the very real and tangible danger posed by the
threat of ECHR sanction has transformed these almost charming sibling rivalries into institutional life and death struggles. Accordingly, it
should come as no surprise that the Conseil d'Etat would turn on the
Cour de cassation in an attempt to save its own skin.
However understandable it may be, such selfish institutional behavior is demeaning to all involved. Notably, even as he struggled to
distinguish the Conseil d'Etat to salvage its traditional working methods, CDG Chauvaux betrayed a certain embarrassment at breaking
ranks with his Cour de cassation colleagues. Completing the argument quoted directly above, he concludes:
The exteriority [of the judicial amicus] relative to the tribunal,
which perhaps justifies the solution adopted by the ECHR regarding other supreme courts, is therefore entirely inapposite regarding
the CDGs .... [To transpose this solution to the Conseil d'Etat]

a false application of
would, in my estimation, therefore constitute
20 6
Article 6 of the European Convention.
Nonetheless, CDG Chauvaux's discomfort-so palpable in his use of
the adverb "perhaps"-could not have done much to soften the blow
caused by his willingness to abandon his Cour de cassation colleagues.
Thus, in addition to the friction the ECHR's Borgers jurisprudence has created between the French and the ECHR and within the
ECHR itself, that line of cases has sown discord within the French
ranks as well. As Guy Canivet, the PremierPrisident (Chief Justice) of
the Cour de cassation, explained in a tone that expressed equal parts
understanding, resignation, and resentment, the Conseil d'Etat had
sacrificed the Cour de cassation as "la part dufeu" (the fire's due); that
20 7
is, the Cour had been surrendered in order to create a fire break.
205
206
207

Escatine, Conseil d'Etat, July 29, 1998, D. 1999, 85, 88, concl. Chauvaux.
Id.
Interview with Canivet, supra note 174.
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IV
THE FRENCH PREDICAMENT AND RESPONSE

A.

The French Predicament: Options Under Duress

Faced with the ECHR's judgments in Reinhardt and Kress, the
French could have taken any number of tacks. For all of the reasons
Harold Koh stresses in his seminal article, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?,208 the only truly untenable position-notwithstanding
Professor Haim's provocatively entitled article Should the European
Court of Human Rights be Abolished?2 09 -was willful and overt disobedience. Such disobedience could have taken either the form of opting
out of the European human rights system altogether or the form of
explicitly defying the Borgers line of jurisprudence. That said, the
French still had plenty of options to consider, ranging from the more
confrontational to the more submissive.
1.

Tactical Resistance

Throughout the ongoing conflict with the ECHR, the French had
taken a path of tactical resistance. On the one hand, they had attempted to resist by setting forth distinctions between their supreme
court practices and those already condemned by the ECHR. On the
other, the French had simultaneously instituted a series of halfhearted and makeshift procedural adjustments designed to preempt
ECHR censure. In the wake of the ECHR's Reinhardt and Kressjudgments, the French could certainly have continued in the same vein.
Nonetheless, it is clear that they were rapidly reaching the limits
of what would qualify as arguably good-faith foot-dragging. How were
they to get around an ECHR "equality of arms" mandate to provide
litigants and the judicial amicus equal access to the rapporteur'swork
product? Would they, or could they, simply give less access to both
the litigants and the amicus? Could they grant litigants full access to
the rapporteur'swork product for the purposes of arguing the case but
somehow require that the released information remain confidential?
Furthermore, how might the French get around the ECHR's ban on
the advocate general's or CDG's presence and/or participation in
post-oral argument judicial deliberations? Could the judicial amicus
be linked to the deliberations by some sort of closed circuit television
with one-way sound, so that he or she might learn from the deliberations without intervening? In short, mere foot-dragging was unquestionably becoming more difficult as the ECHR continued to flesh out
its Borgersjurisprudence.
208
209

See Koh, supra note 196, at 2645-59.
See Haim, supra note 191.
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Of course, the French could also have chosen to adopt a far more
confrontational approach that would unmistakably represent a badfaith subversion of the ECHR's jurisprudence. For instance, the
French could theoretically eliminate the Cour de cassation and Conseil d'Etat altogether.2 1 0 A somewhat less extreme possibility would be
to act on the thinly veiled threat CDG Chauvaux voiced in the Esclatine
case. 2 11 That is, cutting off its nose to spite its face, the French legal
system could undermine the Borgers jurisprudence by simply abolishing the advocate general and CDG institutions. Should the French be
so inclined, a rapporteur,or perhaps a second rapporteur,could take up
the slack by effectively-and, above all, internally-playing the role of
the advocate general.2 12 Of course, the litigants would lose out in the
process, as they would no longer be able to hear the judicial amicus's
oral argument, but at least the essence of the traditional French judicial approach might be salvaged without the French supreme courts
having to prostrate themselves before the ECHR.
In fact, a relatively minor, though blatantly tactical, change of the
CDG's title could accomplish a great deal. Insofar as the CDG's independence and/or his status as a member of the judicial panel might
be in question, the solution could be simply to underline his judicial
status by giving him a title reminiscent of that of the rapporteurin Conseil d'Etat cases (called the conseiller rapporteur). As Professor Andriantsimbazovina slyly, proudly, and perhaps mockingly notes:
To prevent any possible misunderstanding or ambiguity resulting from bad information or bad faith, one might consider modifying the title of the function. In the near future, the commissaire du
gouvernement [i.e., the CDG] could thus be called the "commissairerapporteur." Two words would vaporize; a single one would replace
them. The commissairewould survive thanks to his history, his independence, his impartiality and the service he has rendered, still renders and will continue to render on behalf ofjustice, the public and
2 13
the law.
Needless to say, such sarcastic "solutions" do not appear to be motivated by much more than derisive and antagonistic evasion of the
ECHR's commands.
2.

Good-Faith Compliance

Obviously, the French were by no means required to adopt such
an obstructionist stance, whether in a confrontational or subdued variant. They could simply have taken the tack of good-faith submission
210
211
212
213

See
See
See
See

id.
supra note 153 and accompanying text.
Haim, supra note 192; Andriantsimbazovina, supra note 190.
Andriantsimbazovina, supra note 190.
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to the ECHR's dictates. For example, in addition to the makeshift
measures already adopted, the French supreme courts could also have
barred the judicial amicus from attending post-oral argument judicial
deliberations.
But frankly, how much could the French bank on the ECHR
standing pat on its existing jurisprudence? The Delcourt judgmentwhich upheld the Belgian Supreme Court practices 2 14-had long
since been overturned in Borgers.2 15 And in the Kress decision, the
Strasbourg Court had made it abundantly clear that evolutive interpretation would prevail. As the ECHR stated, "[T]he Convention is a
living instrument to be interpreted in the light of current conditions
and of the ideas prevailing in democratic States today."2 16 Was there
any reason to suppose, therefore, that the French half-measures the
ECHR had currently accepted-even if supplemented by barring the
amicus from deliberations-would continue to stand, particularly in
light of their largely half-baked nature?
Furthermore, even if the French went the extra mile by putting
an end to the rapporteurspre-oral hearing transmission of her work to
the judicial amicus, was there any reason to suppose that this, any
more than the existing half-measures, would withstand ECHR scrutiny
over time? How long would it be before other critically important
facets of the French supreme courts' internal procedures would come
into question?
As this Article has suggested, French judicial decisionmaking
processes involve a very heavy dose of internal, and thus sequestered,
judicial debate, during which a long list of judicial magistrates-ranging from the rapporteur,to the advocate general, to the CDG, to the
reviser, and so on-analyze, consider, and reconsider the merits and
implications of the case, going so far as to vote on and adopt provi2 17
sional judicial decisions well before oral argument ever takes place.
As should be quite apparent by now, there exists more than enough
argumentative ammunition in the Borgers jurisprudence-whether
under the rubric of "equality of arms," or "the doctrine of appearances," or "the adversarial principle"-to justify the overthrow of almost all the working methods traditionally employed by the French
supreme courts.
Finally, it is not as though the ECHR exerts complete control
over the litigation that comes before it. Parties demonstrate, after all,
highly tactical behavior. There is no reason whatsoever to believe that
an ongoing stream of plaintiffs would not continue to push the envel214

See 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
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See 214 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) 22.
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See Kress v. France, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 67-68 (citations omitted).
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ope of the Borgersjurisprudence, exerting a constant pressure on the
ECHR to finish the job that, to date, it has only halfheartedly pursued.
And, of course, every further incursion into the French supreme
courts' decisionmaking processes would only further defeat the rationales and advantages of the French judiciary's traditionally republican
and institutional mode of decisionmaking. In other words, French
submission would pose as many problems as French resistance.
The Actual French Response(s): Schism

B.

In the relatively short period of time since June 2001, when the
ECHR announced its decision in Kress, the contours of the official
French response have come fairly clearly into view. The key to understanding this French response is to recognize that it has not consisted
of one response, but of two. The Conseil d'Etat and Cour de cassation
have parted ways, adopting radically different approaches and solutions to the ECHR's developing Borgersjurisprudence.
1.

The Conseil d'Etat

The Conseil d'Etat-the great Napoleonic institution-has decided to stick to its guns, so to speak. Its approach has been to offer
the stiffest possible resistance by all but ignoring the ECHR's decisions. The Conseil d'Etat has maintained all of the traditional procedures and more recent preemptive half-measures arguably tolerated
by the ECHR's Kress decision. As we have seen, the ECHR has
flinched at this staunch resistance to its developing jurisprudence.2 18
In addition to taking all that the Kress decision arguably permitted (and then some), the Conseil d'Etat effectively stonewalled on the
one important remaining issue: the presence or participation of the
CDG in post-oral argument judicial deliberations. In the very last paragraph of the relevant portion of its Kress decision, the ECHR had
held: "In conclusion, there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention on account of the [CDG's] participation in the deliberations of the trial bench."2 19 On this remaining front, the Conseil
d'Etat has adopted what must be considered a distinctly disingenuous
position. In response to this potentially institutionally debilitating
holding, the Conseil d'Etat has resorted to interpretation so creative
as to border on the comical. The Conseil has taken the position that,
because this holding states that the CDG's "participationin deliberations" violates the European Convention, 220 the CDG can continue to
218

219
220

See supra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
Kress, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 72.
Id. (emphasis added).
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attend deliberations, so long as he does not "participate" in them by
22
speaking4 1

Although such a highly imaginative interpretation does find some
support in the literal language of the ECHR's holding, it hardly withstands a more earnest analysis. As the ECHR made abundantly clear,
the problem with the CDG's presence in deliberations was largely one
of appearances:
81. Lastly, the doctrine of appearancesmust also come into play.
In publicly expressing his opinion on the rejection or acceptance of
the grounds submitted by one of the parties, the [CDG] could legitimately be regarded by the parties as taking sides with one or other
of them ....
The Court can also imagine that a party may have a feeling of
inequality if, after hearing the [CDG] make submissions unfavourable to his case at the end of the public hearing, he sees him
withdraw with the judges of the trial bench to attend the deliberations
held in the privacy of chambers.
82. Since Delcourt, the Court has noted on numerous occasions
that while the independence and impartiality of the Advocate-General or similar officer at certain supreme courts were not open to
criticism, the public's increased sensitivity to the fair administration
of justice justified the growing importance attached to appearances.
It is for this reason that the Court has held that regardless of
the acknowledged objectivity of the Advocate-General or his
equivalent, that officer, in recommending that an appeal on points
of law should be allowed or dismissed, became objectively speaking
the ally or opponent of one of the parties and that his presence at the
deliberationsafforded him, if only to outward appearances,an additional
opportunity to bolster his submissions in private, without fear of
222
contradiction.
Thus, as one might imagine, the ECHR bases its condemnation of
the judicial amicus's "presence" or "attendance" in deliberations
largely on the "doctrine of appearances," concluding that, whatever
the CDG's actual participatory role in the judicial debate, a party who
did not know better might be dismayed that ai amicus who had concluded against the party's position in oral arguments could then retire
with the judges in deliberations.
In short, the Conseil d'Etat's reaction to the Kress holding on this
issue amounts to the Conseil sticking its tongue out at the ECHR.
Given that the ECHR refers explicitly to the CDG's "presence" or "attendance" in deliberations no less than six times in the relevant seven
221

Interview with Braibant, supra note 189; interview with Latournerie, supra note 174.
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paragraphs of its Kressjudgment, 223 it is easy to understand why members of the Conseil d'Etat get a certain twinkle in their eye when they
seize upon the single instance in which the ECHR refers to the CDG's
"participation" in deliberations. Indeed, the conseillers' amusement
must be all the greater, given the heading of the relevant section of
the ECHR's Kressjudgment: "As regards the presence of the [CDG] at
the Conseil dEtat's deliberations." 22 4 In conclusion, then, the Conseil
d'Etat's response to the Borgers jurisprudence has been to minimize
the damage by doing no more than unenthusiastically adopting halfmeasures.
2.

The Cour de Cassation

If the effects of the ECHR's Borgersjurisprudence on the Conseil
d'Etat's procedures appear, to this point, relatively minor, its effects
on the Cour de cassation's procedures must be recognized as truly
paradigm-shifting. Far from resisting the ECHR, the Cour de cassation's judicial leadership-most notably Premier President Guy
Canivet-has seized upon the opportunity provided by the ECHR to
institute a major overhaul of the Cour's internal procedure.
Adopting a zealously cooperative approach, the Cour de cassation
has taken the Kress decision seriously, despite the fact that it was addressed to the Conseil d'Etat.22 5 In stark contrast to the Conseil
d'Etat's disingenuous evasion, the Cour de cassation has taken the
ECHR's admonitions to heart by radically altering the role the judicial
amicus plays in all of its cases. For the first time in some two hundred
years, the advocate general will no longer attend-much less partici2 26
pate in-post-oral argument judicial deliberations.
Moreover, this banishment of the advocate general represents
but one facet of the Cour de cassation's restructuring of its internal
judicial decisionmaking procedures. Rather than stand pat on the
preemptive half-measures apparently sanctioned by the ECHR in its
Kress decision, the Cour has radically reconstructed the entire flow of
information and communication leading up to its decisions.
To begin with, the rapporteurwill no longer grant the advocate
general privileged access to her work product. To the contrary,
neither the advocate general nor the parties will receive copies of the
rapporteur'sdraft judicial decisions or of the second part of her report
(i.e., her personal opinion). Instead, both the advocate general and
223

See id.

Id. at 70.
225
See id. at 43.
226
Interview with Canivet, supra note 174. Of course, the Cour's head amicus, the
Procureurgenra, has argued strenuously against this removal of the advocates general from
deliberations. SeeJean-FranCois Burgelin, L 'avocat gen'rald la Cour de cassation et la Convention europeenne de sauvegarde des Droia de M'omine, Gaz. Pal. mai, 1997.
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the parties will obtain the rest of her report well in advance of oral
arguments. 227 In other words, the parties will receive this information
early enough to fashion a meaningful response. Thus, in the Cour
de cassation, the troublesome unequal access to the rapporteu'swork
product has become a thing of the past.
But that is not all: The rapporteurs report itself has been significandy changed. Traditionally, the report had been composed of two
sections. The first, which was read aloud at the opening of oral arguments, contained a barebones summary of the parties' positions (the
"rapport objectif); the second consisted of the rapporteursall-important,
yet externally unavailable, opinion (her "avis"). 228 Now that the rapport objectif is fully accessible to the litigants in a timely fashion and
represents the sum total of what the advocate general will receive
from the rapporteur,this "objective" section of the report has been significantly expanded.
In addition to a summary of the parties' positions, the core of this
section now consists of a detailed presentation and explanation of the
rapporteu7's legal and analytic framework. 229 Although the rapporteur's
subjective opinion remains inaccessible to all but the sitting members
of the judicial panel, 230 the amount of analytic and decisional information granted to the litigants has significantly increased, while the
informational loss suffered by the advocate general has been somewhat mitigated.
Most remarkable, however, is the suddenly public availability of
this rapport objectif 231 Indeed, the idea that the rapporteu's report
might escape the personal control of its author and be given to the
parties was, at least at first, virtually inconceivable. It was precisely for
this reason that, as a glib graduate student seeking to provoke his audience at a Cour de cassation conference, I once suggested that the
Cour should actually publish the rapporteurs'reports, thus making them
23 2
available to the general public.
Amazingly, some ten years later, that is precisely what the Cour de
cassation has decided to do. In all important cases-i.e., the 150 to
200 cases handled every year by the assorted plenary formations of the
Cour (the PMniresand Plgniresde Chambre)-the official bulletin actually publishes this signed and detailed "objective report." In fact, the
227
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See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
Interview with Canivet, supra note 174.
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See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
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See Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, Autoportraitsjudiciaires: le discours inteme et externe de la Cour de cassation, in "Langages dejustice," Les cahiers de i'IHEJ, no. 2, p. 28
(Octobre 1994).
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Cour now automatically e-mails this bulletin twice a month to anyone
who signs up online to receive it.233
In sum, unlike the Conseil d'Etat, the Cour de cassation has
taken bold and decisive action to respond to the procedural concerns
raised by the ECHR's evolvingjurisprudence. Now that the ECHR has
at least tentatively and temporarily set the procedural parameters, the
Cour has taken the initiative and adopted an approach that even gives
substance to previously half-hearted and makeshift measures. For example, now that litigants receive significant and timely access to the
core of the rapporteurs legal analysis, the right to respond to that legal
analysis, whether orally or by a written note in deliberations, suddenly
acquires purpose and meaning. Thus, the interplay between the Cour
de cassation and the ECHR has profoundly altered the traditional
French model of judicial decisionmaking, if only in one of the French
supreme courts.
V
EVAI.UATING THE FRENCH COURTS' RESPONSES

It is terribly important to recognize that the interchange between
the ECHR and the French supreme courts represents, by definition, a
fluid and constantly shifting affair. The Borgersjurisprudence is not a
stable object of analysis. It consists of an ongoing exchange between
the ECHR and the national legal systems, in which each of the numerous players involved responds to each of the others in a complex series of preemptive, reactive, and proactive moves. For this reason, this
Article offers two separate sections analyzing costs and benefits. An
assessment of the state of affairs immediately after the Kress decision
could not legitimately include-and, without a crystal ball, likely
could not have anticipated-the schismatic French responses that
would follow. Similarly, the current French supreme court schism has
serious ramifications for each of the many institutional and other actors directly and indirectly affected. Thus, although some of the advantages and disadvantages highlighted in Part IV continue to apply in
much the same way today, many of them do not.
The French schism thus deeply affects our analysis, as the assessment of costs and benefits must now be made in two distinctly different procedural contexts: that of the Conseil d'Etat and that of the
233 The web address to sign up to receive electronic copies of the Bulletin d'information
de la Cour de cassation is http://courdecassation.fr/_BICC/bicc.htm (last visited Feb. 22,
2005). Even in less prominent cases, the Cour de cassation has decided to give these reports far greater publicity. Instead of remaining the property of the rapporteur,every report-even if unpublished-now remains in the Cour's dossiers and is available via the
Cour's internal server. The rapporteurs' reports thus now serve as the Cour's "institutional
memory." Interview with Canivet, supra note 174.
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Cour de cassation. Furthermore, the schism itself undoubtedly entails
significant costs and benefits. If nothing else, it has generated not
only an inelegant and illogical split between the two French supreme
courts, but, as we have seen, it has also provoked the Conseil d'Etat's
highly distasteful-though perfectly understandable-abandonment
of the Cour de cassation. 23 4 One must be very shortsighted indeed to
believe that such disloyalty would not produce ongoing effects both
inside and outside the French legal system.
A.

The Conseil d'Etat

For the Conseil d'Etat itself, the costs and benefits of the current
state of affairs do not seem to be terribly different than they were at
the time of the Kress decision. This apparent stability rests on the
combination of two factors: first, the tepid or Solomonic nature of the
Kress decision, and second, the Conseil d'Etat's disingenuous refusal
to satisfy meaningfully the Kressjudgment's relatively tame demands.
At first blush, therefore, the current state of affairs does not appear to represent a major loss for the Conseil d'Etat. Most important,
in the Kress decision, the ECHR gave its blessing to the CDG's continued existence: "As to the [CDG], the Court equally accepts that it is
undisputed that his role is not that of a State counsel's office and that
it is a sui generis institution peculiar to the organisation of administrative-court proceedings in France."2 35 The decision also condoned, if
only obliquely, the traditional practice whereby the CDG delivers his
opinion (conclusions) at oral arguments without having transmitted
236
them in advance to the parties.
Furthermore, the condition of stasis in the Conseil d'Etat has
been all the more complete, because the Conseil had already done
the bare minimum in the way of preemptive adjustment prior to the
Kress case before simply stonewalling with respect to the rest. For example, litigants were traditionally permitted both to ask the CDG for
the gist of his position prior to oral argument and to submit a written
note in deliberations after oral argument. Thus, the developing
Borgersjurisprudence merely prompted the Conseil to formalize this
longstanding practice. If one adds to this stunningly modest achievement not only (1) the Kress decision's total failure to address the unequal access accorded to the rapporteu'swork product, but also (2) the
Conseil d'Etat's highly creative interpretation of Kress's condemnation
of the CDG's "participation in" deliberations, 23 7 it is difficult to imagine how much less effect the ECHR's jurisprudence could possibly
234
235
236
237
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have had on the Conseil d'Etat's traditional decisionmaking procedures. Indeed, those procedures have survived more or less unscathed. Undoubtedly, such stasis must be counted as a major loss for
the disgruntled ECHR plaintiffs-and perhaps for the ECHR itself.
But such a narrow focus on the current procedural effects of the
ECHR's jurisprudence fails to recognize the tremendous institutional
cost that "la crise Kress" has nonetheless imposed on the Conseil d'Etat.
On one level, the Conseil has expended a tremendous amount of time
and energy to survive the ECHR litigation onslaught. But this represents the least of the Conseil's troubles. Oddly enough, the real problem is that the Conseil d'Etat has largely succeeded in its resistance. It is
the only European supreme court still meaningfully withstanding the
ECHR's Borgers jurisprudence, for not only have the Belgian, Dutch,
and Portuguese supreme courts adapted or modified their decisionmaking procedures, but now even the French Cour de cassation has
done so as well. This leaves the Conseil d'Etat utterly stranded, its
status thus transformed from the exemplary into the exceptional. Far
from representing, alongside the French Cour de cassation, the flagship of the French procedural model, the Conseil now consists of a
retrograde relic.
Furthermore, although the Conseil may take pride in having salvaged as much as possible of its traditional decisionmaking practices,
those practices-and indeed its entire institution-have now been
tainted with a strong hint of impropriety. Constructed in this unflattering way, it is hard to believe that the Conseil d'Etat will maintain its
current procedural structure for long.
First, there is every reason to assume that tactically minded plaintiffs will continue to bring litigation challenging the Conseil's procedures. Second, the Kress decision's equivocation makes it very difficult
to determine the legal consequences of the Conseil d'Etat's continued
defiance. Is the Conseil actually violating the ECHR's Borgers/Kressjurisprudence? That is, can the Conseil's almost comically disingenuous
interpretation of one sentence of the Kress decision truly pass muster
in the ECHR? Similarly, can the Conseil d'Etat legally continue to
provide unequal access to the rapporteur's work product merely because the Kress decision did not squarely address the issue, despite the
fact that the ECHR's Reinhardt decision explicitly condemned the
Cour de cassation's parallel-and largely indistinguishable-practice?
This jurisprudential uncertainty, which undoubtedly represents a major disadvantage to the current state of affairs for almost everyone involved (most notably the litigants and the ECHR), only increases
pressure on the Conseil d'Etat to conform.
Third, there is no particular reason to suppose that the ECHR
will continue to provide cover for the Conseil indefinitely. The rela-
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tively forgiving Kress decision undoubtedly goes somewhat against the
current of the ECHR's developing Brgersjurisprudence. As a result, it
seems unlikely that the ECHR will continue to weaken the consistency
and coherence of its own jurisprudence just to soften the blow for
what is now a single island of resistance-one whose very status as an
exceptional leftover only invites further litigation. Moreover, the very
inconsistency and equivocation of the Kress decision imposes systemic
credibility costs on the ECHR, which appears in some respects to have
balked, and perhaps even yielded, in the face of the Conseil d'Etat's
staunch resistance. Having pulled its punches in Kress, the ECHR may
reasonably be expected to bring down the hammer at some point in
the future.
Fourth, and perhaps most important, the Conseil d'Etat's isolation, complete with the attendant whiff of impropriety, may make it
untenable for the Conseil to maintain its exceptional stance over the
long term. For all of the reasons explained by Harold Koh, disobedience-and, I might add, dubious or disingenuous satisfaction-of international law norms is a highly unpleasant affair for everyone
involved. 23-8 For all of the conseillers' righteous indignation, for all of
their sincere disagreement with the logic of the Borgersjurisprudence,
and for all of their pride in resisting its demands, the professional and
social discomfort generated by maintaining a now vaguely disreputable decisionmaking procedure is likely more than sufficient to induce
the Conseil to change its practice. The members of the Conseil d'Etat
have long been quite proud of their status as vigilant defenders of civil
liberties, and it is, therefore, particularly jarring for them to defend
against the charge of systematically violating international human
rights norms. Longtime members of the Conseil may be willing to
defend the old ways to the end, but younger members, increasingly
internationally conscious and connected, are ever more unlikely to
find such a disagreeable defense worth the effort, recognizing that
their own status can be measured less and less in national isolation.
The costs and benefits of the current state of the Borgerslitigation
are, therefore, fairly difficult to assess in the Conseil d'Etat context.
On the one hand, the litigation has generated very little in the way of
tangible results. The Conseil d'Etat has merely formalized already existing practices, leaving not only the ECHR plaintiffs, but also the
ECHR itself, with almost nothing to show for their work. To add insult to injury, the Conseil d'Etat and its supporters, truly indignant
that a pall of suspicion has fallen over the Conseil's time-honored
working methods, have mobilized to denounce and resist the ECHR
despite the relatively slight concessions the Strasbourg Court has, so
238
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far, required the Conseil to make. In short, the tally looks poor: minimal procedural change, significant reputational losses for both the
Conseil and the ECHR, and plenty of ill will to go around.
On the other hand, the current state of the Borgers litigation can
be viewed as a brilliant, if rather subtle, success. In essence, the ECHR
has fashioned a relatively velvet-glove method for inducing the Conseil d'Etat to change its procedures of its own accord. In the shortterm, the ECHR has allowed the Conseil d'Etat and its CDGs to maintain virtually all of their traditions and working methods. Although
this stasis may appear to be a loss for litigants-especially the ECHR
plaintiffs-and for the ECHR itself, it represents a form of self-induced and eventually untenable isolation on the part of the Conseil
d'Etat. Unable to bear its now exceptional and vaguely disreputable
position over the long haul, the Conseil d'Etat will likely-if perhaps
incrementally and somewhat grudgingly-come to conform to the
Borgers/Kressjurisprudencewithout the ECHR having to condemn the
proud French institution outright.
B.

The Cour de Cassation

Unlike the Conseil d'Etat, which has resisted procedural change
in the wake of the Kress decision, the Cour de cassation has seized
upon the opportunity provided by the ECHR by instituting a major
overhaul of the Cour's internal procedure. This bold development
utterly transforms the nature of French judicial decisionmaking procedure and calls for a major reassessment of the costs and benefits of
the ECHR's Borgers jurisprudence in the context of France's ordinary
courts.
1. A Wealth of Benefits
First and foremost, the Cour de cassation's procedural shift tremendously increases the transparency of its decisionmaking process.
The newfound accessibility of the rapporteu's "objective report" represents a major opening of the judicial universe to the general public,
which can now observe what issues are considered important to the
judiciary. After all, the purpose of the objective report is to make the
rapporteui's legal and analytic framework available not only to the
judges and litigants, but also to the public at large-at least in important cases.
It goes without saying that this new judicial transparency radically
reduces the degree of guesswork traditionally associated with French
judicial interpretation. Customarily, it was the French academic who
functioned as the broker of French judicial knowledge. The job of
the arrtist--the doctrinal (academic) writer who commented on major judicial decisions (armts) in the French case reporters-consisted
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precisely 6f analyzing and explaining the famously brief and opaque
judgments of the French judiciary. Thus, it was the academic, not the
court itself, who provided primary access to the logic of the French
judicial decision. 2 9 That said, the French academic did not generally
have special access to the court's reasoning. Although in certain instances the academic may have gained access to a friendly rapporteus
report, he was not privy to the court's deliberations and, therefore,
could hardly claim to act on behalf of the sitting judicial panel. Indeed, the arretiste's considerable expertise consisted precisely of deciphering the oracular syllogisms of the French high judiciary. He
meticulously compared the language of current and past decisions,
consulted the analyses of his academic colleagues in the notes they had
written about and appended to prior judicial decisions, and offered a
critical assessment of the state of the existing judicial jurisprudence. In
short, the academic could not claim to possess a special form of knowledge about judicial decisions; instead, his job consisted in some important sense of constructing and disseminating this knowledge.
The Cour de cassation's new procedure radically changes this
state of affairs. Access to the Cour's reasoning now primarily comes
not from the academic, but from one of the judges actually sitting in a
given case: the rapporteur. What is more, the parties themselves now
have access to this hard internal information well before oral argument and can adjust their arguments accordingly. Better yet, this information is now publicly available through publication by the Cour
itself. For the first time, therefore, the French judicial publication system discloses hard judicial information rather than informed academic conjecture.
This new judicial transparency obviously greatly increases the
level of external judicial supervision and responsibility in the French
judicial system. The parties, the academic writers, and the general
public can monitor the quality of judicial work, which can now be
assessed and critiqued in an informed manner. Furthermore, it is not
just the Cour as a whole that operates in more plain view. The rapporteur finds her own position radically altered: For the first time in
French history, and whether or not she so wishes, her personally
signed work product is now systematically published. The French
judge thus finds herself individually accountable in a way that simply
never existed before.
The Cour de cassation's reforms, therefore, significantly modernize the French judicial system. On a basic level, they put the Cour de
cassation in compliance with the ECHR's developing Borgers/Kressjurisprudence. But this compliance is not only important for its own
239
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sake. Besides fostering the abstract value of harmonization, this new
publication procedure also renders the Cour de cassation's judgments
more understandable to outsiders, which can only help in this era of
exploding cross-border, and especially intra-European, transactions.
By modernizing and harmonizing in this way, it is likely that the
Cour de cassation will significantly increase its visibility and status.
Thus, according to Chief Justice Canivet, these reforms mean that
members of the Cour de cassation will no longer have to struggle to
make apparent the serious and imaginative intellectual work that lies
behind the French judicial syllogism. 240 Moreover, the justices of the
Cour will no longer have to labor in personal obscurity. Instead, they
will take their rightful position among the great jurists of their day,
just as the Cour itself-now that it will expose the finesse of what lies
behind its elegant syllogisms-will take its rightful place among the
24 1
great supreme courts of the world.
Finally, the Cour's reforms offer the significant advantage of increasing the Cour de cassation's status relative to the Conseil d'Etat.
The importance of this reputational bonus should not be underestimated. The Conseil d'Etat's exceptional internal status as a "grand
corps" of the French state-an exalted position shared by only two
other great French administrative institutions (i.e., the Inspection gnrale des finances and the Cour des comptes) -has always grated on the
members of the Cour de cassation, who, despite their own highly elevated status as members of the supreme court that ultimately interprets the Napoleonic Code, have never carried the special cachet
reserved for those lofty few who have attended and excelled at one of
the French grandes gcoles.2 42 If one adds to this longstanding source of
frustration the Conseil d'Etat's unseemly, disloyal, and self-serving
abandonment of the Cour de cassation during "la crise Kress," one can
readily understand the particular pleasure members of the Cour
might take at becoming the "modern" and "human rights-friendly"
French supreme court. Essentially, the Conseil d'Etat's apparent willingness to play the role of retrograde represents a status opportunity
for the Cour de cassation.
To sum up, the Cour de cassation's reforms offer an excellent
balance of interests and policies. These reforms move the Cour into
compliance with the ECHR's jurisprudence and, in so doing, facilitate
harmonization and understanding with the rest of Europe. In addi240
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tion, they significantly increase transparency and intelligibility for litigants, the French public at large, and the greater European public.
Finally, they improve the reputation of the Cour de cassation, in particular, and perhaps that of the French judiciary in general.
Furthermore, it should be recognized that the Cour's reforms
may not strike unduly harshly at the Cour's traditional decisionmaking processes. First, they maintain many of the Cour's collegial work
methods and expert forms of debate. After all, the rapporteurand advocate general continue to perform their important discursive roles,
even if the advocate general has lost some of his privileged argumentative position in favor of improving that of the litigants. Second, the
reforms have by no means entirely eliminated the protected seclusion
that has traditionally characterized French judicial decisionmaking.
Indeed, in spite of its reforms, the Cour has made sure to preserve the
time-honored form of its judicial decisions. The Cour's judgments
continue to be composed as unsigned and single-sentence collegial
syllogisms devoid of concurrences or dissents. In other words, the
publication of the objective report has not affected the ability of the
judicial panel as a whole to continue to keep its secrets.
Moreover, even the rapporteuris not fully exposed. Although the
objective report does present the legal and analytic framework governing the case, it makes sure not to offer for public consumption the
rapporteur's avis-i.e., his personal opinion about how that framework
should in the end be mobilized in response to the case at hand. In
many respects, therefore, French judicial decisionmaking remains a
protected "black box," notwithstanding the Cour de cassation's nota2 43
ble reforms.
2.

The Demise of the Ministre Public?

Nevertheless, this rosy assessment of the balancing of interests accomplished by the Cour de cassation's reforms fails to recognize the
full magnitude of the changes wrought by these reforms. Most importantly, the Cour's procedural changes have rested on what must be
described as the effective annihilation of the entire institution of the
advocates general, the Ministrepublic. The advocate general, for hundreds of years a privileged player in the French internal judicial debates, has been reduced to a mundane discursive player more akin to
a party than to a judicial magistrate. 24 4 As such, the advocate general
no longer receives privileged access to the rapporteurskey work product: her avis and draft judgment(s).
Interview with Canivet, supra note 174.
SeeJean-Claude Bonichot et Ronny Abraham, Le commissaire du gouvernement dans la
juridiction administrativeet la Convention europgenne des droits de l'homnme, JCP 1998, I, n' 176.
243
244

2005]

THE EUROPEAN PASTEURIZATION OF FRENCH LAW

1059

Needless to say, this loss of information represents the death of a
special conversation that had long been the defining characteristic of
the internal French judicial decisionmaking process, i.e., the privileged and highly informed pre-oral argument discussions between the
rapporteurand the advocate general. This removal of the advocate
general from the secluded inner sanctum of French judicial decisionmaking has even been made physically explicit: The advocate general
is now barred altogether from attending the all-important judicial discussions in preparationfor oral arguments.
As if this were not enough, the Cour's reforms have likewise removed the advocate general from the post-oral argument judicial deliberations. As a result, not only can the advocate general no longer
take part in the final judicial deliberations, but he now also loses out
on the understanding and professional training that exposure to these
deliberations traditionally provided. 245 Instead of receiving an informed internal perspective on the judicial discussions that followed
on the heels of the conclusions he had presented at oral arguments, the
advocate general must simply sit back and await the Cour's cryptic syllogisms just like any other observer. In other words, except for his
initial judicial education at ENM (the national judge school in Bordeaux) and his professional experience as a repeat player, the advocate general no longer possesses or develops any form of distinctive
professional knowledge that he can bring to the judicial decisionmaking process.
This educational and professional loss, when combined with the
everyday loss of access to the rapporteurs key documents, necessarily
entails a dramatic long-term loss of status and influence. Although
today's seasoned advocates general will still be able to employ the professional training, knowledge, and comradeship they have traditionally possessed, this will be the last such generation. From this point
forward, incoming advocates general will develop few of those internal
and institutional ties in the first place.
Needless to say, this change in professional status can only yield a
change in daily professional practice. To the extent that the advocates general no longer have access to the work product of the rapporteurs, they will no longer be able to exercise effectively their
traditional amicus role. On a deeply practical level, it must first be
recognized that the Minist~republic corps attached to the Cour de cassation consists of a mere twenty-four advocates general. 246 Given the
Cour's truly massive caseload, 247 it is simply inconceivable that the
245
SeeJean-Franoois Burgelin, Droit et libertefondamentaux: La paille et la poutre, D. 2004,
Chron. 1249, 1250.
See de Gouttes, supra note 186.
246
See supra note 53.
247
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small corps of advocates general could effectively overcome the loss of
the rapporteurs'preparatory materials. 248 Forced to replicate that preliminary work, the advocates general will either have to reduce the
number of cases in which they intervene or reduce the proportion of
time they spend performing their valuable analytic and dialogic
functions.
Furthermore, this strictly numerical inefficiency does not even
begin to address the argumentative loss. No longer privileged internal players, the advocates general have lost their traditional capacity
to develop an intimate internal understanding of the intellectual currents within the Cour de cassation, and without that internal understanding, they can no longer engage in the kind of dialogue and
interchange that had been the hallmark of their work and the very
raison detre of their institutional position. Their arguments have thus
been reduced to just that: arguments. They are no longer part and
parcel of the Cour's most important deliberations.
It should probably come as no surprise, therefore, that the members of the Ministre public have responded with hostility to the Cour
de cassation's ECHR-provoked diminution of their longstanding institutional role. The exasperation of the Cour de cassation's chief advocate general,Jean-Franois Burgelin, thus shines through the remarks
he gave upon the ceremonial opening of the 2002 judicial year:
The legislator ... thus required the Advocate General to give
his opinion in all cases brought before the Cour. This is mandated
[by the Codes of Criminal and Civil Procedure].
But alas! This exalted mission will no longer be performed in a
proper fashion.
In fact, due to a dubious interpretation of several decisions rendered in the last few years by the ECHR-an interpretation contested by all of the judicial magistrates of our Ministate public-the
Advocate General will now be able to perform only partially his public interest mission.
He is now denied access to the judicial conference in preparation of oral arguments and to the Cour's deliberations; he will
therefore no longer follow the intellectual developments and the
legal discussions that are expressed there.
He is now denied as well communication of the opinion and
draft judgment of the ReportingJudge, and will no longer, due to
the small size of the judicial amicus corps, be able to give his opinion
in every case, despite the requirements of the legislative texts.
Justice at the Cour de cassation will thus be rendered in many
cases without the Advocate General having had the opportunity to
248
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stress the general interest or to express his opinion on the proper
interpretation of the law.
This represents a significant setback for the quality of our justice. It serves no good to hide this fact; and history will be able to
say who was responsible for this loss.
The second look that the Advocate General gave, after the Reporting Judge, to each dossier was an essential procedural guarantee given to the litigants, who had the certitude that two high
magistrates belonging to separate judicial institutions-the sitting
judiciary and the amicus corps-had fully studied their dossier.
These ancient customs, which had no other foundation than
the common good and the interest of those who have recourse to
the judicial system will disappear or at least wither away without anyone being able to give a good reason why.
I find myself utterly unable to discern the progress that these
changes, instituted against our will, might make for human rights.
As I have indicated, I see to the contrary a weakening of these
24 9
rights.
Burgelin's pitiful complaints thus mark, in many respects, the death
throes of the corps of the advocates general. Stripped of their traditional institutional prerogatives, the advocates general can probably
no longer be considered a major, much less integral, player in the
French judicial decisionmaking process.
It, therefore, makes perfect sense that the advocates general, in a
desperate, last-ditch attempt to sidetrack the Cour's destructive procedural reforms, actually went on strike.2 50 Insisting on 25-and awaiting in vain-the passage of a legislative or administrative text whose
consequences might be less dire than the reforms instituted against
their will by Chief Justice Canivet, the advocates general simply decided to stop producing their conclusions altogether.2 52 This resistance, though ultimately ineffective, was not illogical. Premierprisident
Canivet had imposed drastic reforms despite the fact that it was not
entirely clear that he actually had the authority to do so. As Procureur
g6ngralBurgelin's remarks indicate above, 253 the duty of the advocates
general to give their opinion in all Cour de cassation cases is based in
249 Jean-Francois Burgelin, Speech at the Cour de cassation in Paris on the occasion of
the solemn hearing opening of the new judicial year (Jan. 11, 2002), in Annual Report of
the Cour de cassation, Etudes et documents, at http://courdecassation.fr/-rapport/rapport.htm (translation by the author).
See interview with Canivet, supra note 174; interview with Braibant, supranote 189.
250
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251
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the Code. 254 Procedural adjustments that affect this codified duty
might not, therefore, be appropriately effectuated by informal, nontext-based means.
Moreover, it is tellingly unclear whether the Cour's Premierpresident could traditionally be considered the hierarchical superior of the
Cour's head advocate general. In some important sense, the Cour de
cassation was perhaps best understood, at least until these reforms, as
possessing two "chiefjustices": the head of the sitting members of the
judiciary (currently PremierPresidentCanivet) and the head of the judicial amicus corps (currently ProcureurginralBurgelin).255 This leadership bifurcation not only gives a very good indication of the
traditional importance of the advocates general, but also adds fuel to
the advocates generals' claim that "textual" measures were needed to
transform French judicial decisionmaking procedure so radically.
In short, there is no particular reason to minimize the effect or
magnitude of the reforms provoked by the ECHR. These procedural
developments have effectively sacrificed the time-honored French institution of the advocates general and have, therefore, significantly
shifted the traditional balance of argumentative power within the
French judicial system.
3.

The FrenchJudiciary'sRise to InstitutionalPower

The Cour de cassation's reforms must, therefore, be recognized
as a truly seminal moment in the history of French and European law.
To state the point bluntly, these reforms have paved the way for an
enormous rise in French judicial power, status, and authority. This
shift in the balance of French argumentative power flows not only
from the marginalization of the advocate general's role, but also from
the publication of the rapporteur's objective report, which consists
largely of the rapporteur's analysis of what Americans might call "the
state of the law" in a given doctrinal area. Most notably, it retraces
and examines in depth lajurisprudence-themost important and pertinent judicial decisions. As a result, the routine publication of the rapporteu's objective report means, by definition, a tremendous increase
not only in the status and availability, but also in the analytic and normative centrality, of French judicial jurisprudencein the published judicial record and thus in all future legal debates.
There is nothing new about publishing important French judicial
decisions alongside contextualizing documents that present and analyze the development of the courts' jurisprudence. After all, important
French judicial decisions have traditionally been accompanied in the
254
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case reporters by an analytic note composed by a reputable French academic specialized in the substantive area of the case.2 5 6 That said, it is
one thing for the contextualizing document to be written by an academic who possesses no particular internal knowledge about the judgment in question;2 57 it is quite another thing for that document to be
generated by the single most procedurally important member of the
sitting judicial panel, the rapporteur.
In short, the publication of the objective reports will likely
change quite dramatically the status and authority of French Cour de
cassation decisions. Whereas the rather formulaic French judicial decision has historically been accompanied by external, and thus somewhat conjectural, ruminations about judicial developments, that
decision will now be supported by relatively reliable judicial explanations of the Cour's own reasoning. Consequently, publication of the
reports changes the status of the public's knowledge of French judicial decisions; now that internal knowledge is publicly available, only
an incompetent attorney would not put this jurisprudentialinformation at the very center of his own legal analyses.
The production and publication of the rapporteurs' objective reports thus threatens to drive judicial jurisprudenceinto the limelight of
future French legal debate. Such publication will allow, and eventually likely require, French legal discussion to be framed by an analysis
of past judicial decisions, and it seems likely that French judicial decisions will shift from merely persuasive to veritably controlling normative authority. In other words, one may fairly assume that it will only
be a matter of time before French judicial jurisprudenceformally becomes a true "source of the law" in its own right.2 58 It should be noted
that this conceptual transformation would represent the wholesale
abandonment of the most fundamental and defining imperative of
the traditional French politico-legal system-that judges cannot make
25 9
law.
In addition to this important conceptual transformation, the
publication of the objective report also profoundly alters the balance
of argumentative and normative power between the various players in
the French judicial process. Most important, this rise in judicial au2 60
thority comes most directly at the French legal academic's expense.
256

See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.

257

See id.

258

Cf.supra Part I.B.4.

259

See id.

Maryse Deguergue's analysis of the traditional relationship between the academic
260
writers and the commissaires du Gouvernement at the Conseil d'Etat beautifully demonstrates
the prior state of affairs. She refers to the CDGs as the "messengers of la doctrine." See
MARYSE DEGUERGUE, JURISPRUDENCE ET DOCTRINE DANS L'ELABORATION Du DROIT DE LA
RESPONSABILITE ADMINISTRATIVE 722-39 (1994).
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This is because in some important sense, the French doctrinal author-rather than the judiciary-has traditionally represented, by
means of the doctrinal note, the primary vector for the formulation and
transmission of knowledge about French judicial decisions. 261 Now
that such knowledge is overtly formulated and disseminated by the
sitting members of the judiciary, the academic necessarily becomes yet
another passive judicial observer. The argumentative and normative
status of la doctrine will likely decline accordingly.
This rise in the availability, and thus the authority, of French judicial argument will also likely entail a concomitant fall in the openness
of French legal debate. The linguistic opacity and lack of formal legal
status of the French judicial decision has traditionally provided the
opportunity for nonjudicial institutional players to debate the meaning and importance of particular judicial decisions and thereby to exercise significant argumentative and normative authority. The new
publication of previously internal judicial documents that contain the
judiciary's analysis of its own jurisprudence will tend to concentrate
such authority in the hands of French judges, likely resulting in a loss
of argumentative freedom for the system's other institutional players.
In other words, the French judiciary will now be in a position to do
something that has traditionally been beyond its purview: to exercise
spin control over the meaning and import of its own judicial
decisions.
Perhaps the clearest symbol of this shift in judicial status is the
startling fact that not only will the objective report be published in
every important Cour de cassation case, but that it will also be signed
by the rapporteur. This publication of individually signed judicial analyses clearly alters the rigidly communal and institutional nature of the
Cour's traditional work processes. For the first time, individual judges
will routinely have the ability to appeal directly to people, interests,
and standards beyond the Cour. In other words, individual judicial
authority and effectiveness can now be linked to factors external to
the Cour itself. This new crack in the Cour de cassation's protective
seclusion could, therefore, entail a certain loss in French judicial independence-with individual notoriety and influence comes external
critique and pressure.
Furthermore, the new French judicial signature breaks the selfeffacing anonymity and collegiality that have always been the earmarks of French judicial decisionmaking. Individual judges may gain
a certain enduring publicity and notoriety. One may assume that such
an increase in individual judicial celebrity will provoke a general rise
261
See discussion supsa Part I.B.5; see atlo LASSER, JuDICIAL DEUBERATIONS, supra note 9,
at 304 (exploring the relationship between the judicial syllogism and its companion doctrinal note).
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in the visibility of the judiciary as a whole, defeating once again the
fundamental logic of the traditional French judicial system. The Cour
de cassation's reforms thus grant its justices-and eventually the Cour
itself-a personal, analytic, and normative prominence which, until
now, they had been rather carefully and most intentionally denied.
Although the Cour de cassation's reforms have done quite a bit
to increase the argumentative visibility-and thus normative dominance-of the Cour and its justices, one cannot stress enough that
these reforms have done remarkably little to grant direct access to the
Cour's judicial reasoning. After all, the classic form of the Cour de
cassation judgment remains firmly in place; it still consists of an unsigned, single-sentence, collegial syllogism that reveals very little of its
underlying logic. In short, it offers nothing more than it ever has.
Moreover, even the published objective report offers distinctly
less information than one might have imagined. Its name-the objective report-in fact quite effectively conveys the limited nature of its
charge. That is, this report summarizes and presents the state of the
relevant legislation, judicial jurisprudence, and academic doctrine. As
such, it lays out the fundamental legal framework and analytic context
of the case before the Cour. Although the judicial disclosure of this
material and conceptual background undoubtedly represents a significant increase in the transparency of the Cour de cassation's decisionmaking process, it should also be apparent that such schematic
disclosure hardly grants full and direct access to the rapporteur'smuch less the Cour de cassation's-evaluation and eventual resolution of the legal and other issues raised by the case at bar.
Although the objective report offers an important prism through
which the Cour's observers can glimpse the basic lay of the legal land
as seen by at least one of the Cour's members, that report certainly
does not provide a clear, direct, or authoritative statement of the important legal, policy, interpretive, or other factors guiding and eventually motivating the Cour's decision. In fact, it is precisely at this allimportant moment, when objective factors and subjective appreciation come together, that the Cour de cassation continues to deny its
external observers access to its thought process. It is, therefore, no
accident that the Cour publishes only the rapporteus objective report.
The second part of her work product-her personal opinion and
draft judgment(s)-remains secreted within the inaccessible internal
discursive sphere of the high French judiciary. And intentionally so:
The internal discourse of the upper reaches of the French judiciary
remains in a black box that protects the interpersonal and highly sub-
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jective equity arguments that have long been an essential component
26 2
of the Cour de cassation's reasoning.
In other words, the Cour de cassation's reforms represent a compromise. They increase access to the analytic framework presented by
the rapporteur, but they make sure to maintain the Cour's collegial syllogisms and to preserve a shielded discursive sphere in which the high
French judiciary can continue to exercise its traditional modes ofjudicial decisionmaking.
Like all compromises, this compromise may be assessed in very
different lights. As we have seen, the Cour's reforms may represent a
brilliantly nuanced solution to the dilemma posed by the ECHR's
Borgers/Kressjurisprudence. The parties and the general public can
learn in a timely and ongoing fashion about the existing state of the
law and can thus meaningfully converse with their opponents, the advocate general, the rapporteur,and the Cour as a whole. The Cour's
reforms can therefore be undertstood to increase public access to the
Cour's reasoning without compromising the more substantive and equitable elements of that reasoning through excessive exposure.
On the other hand, one might easily understand the Cour's reforms to represent the worst of both worlds. First, they compromise
almost all of the important objectives of the traditional French judicial
system. These reforms allow, and even encourage, the visibility and
authority of judicial decisions, individual judges, and the judiciary to
rise exponentially. With the abandonment of the advocates general,
the depth and quality of internal judicial debate threatens to deteriorate. Finally, the increase in judicial exposure deals a crippling blow
to the argumentative input and normative control of academic doctrine. In short, the Cour de cassation's own reforms have willingly sacrificed the complex fragmentation of French legal debate, which has
traditionally offered a highly effective technique for limiting the ability of the judiciary to exercise concentrated normative power.
As a matter of further concern, this potentially massive increase
in the judiciary's argumentative prominence and normative dominance may not be tamed or counterbalanced by sufficient individual,
public, and argumentative judicial accountability. The Cour de cassation's sphinx-like judicial decisions remain unchanged in their unsigned, single-sentence, collegial and syllogistic form. Although the
rapporteur7'sobjective report will now supplement the Cour's most important decisions, that document offers little in the way of individual,
argumentative judicial accountability. After all, this document contains the work of only one of the sitting members of the judicial

262

See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
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panel-work that may or may not accurately reflect the analytic framework of the judicial panel as a whole.
Indeed, this objective report hardly represents the totality of the
rapporteur'sown production. It intentionally refuses access to precisely
the information that meaningful judicial accountability and public understanding might require, i.e., a serious account of the-potentially
different-means by which the various members of the court approached, considered, and ultimately resolved the difficult issues that
underlie the case at bar. In short, it is not at all clear that the limited
increase in access to the Cour de cassation's decisionmaking process
sufficiently compensates for the significant deliberative, institutional,
and cultural losses that the Cour's reforms have occasioned.
VI
THE

FuLL

DIMENSION OF THE PROBLEM

The foregoing analysis elucidates the fact that the fundamental
problem underlying the Borgers/Kress line of litigation is the clash of
two quite different understandings of judicial control and legitimacy.
The French system has traditionally rested on a distinctly republican
vision of elite and sheltered institutional debate and deliberation. 263
By contrast, the system promoted by the ECHR's Borgersjurisprudence
rests on a far more populist vision of individual and public legal argumentation. It is precisely the incommensurability of these two distinct
visions that has provoked the painful and ongoing conflicts between
the ECHR, the French supreme courts, and other European supreme
courts patterned on the French model.
A.

A Quick Recap

As Part I demonstrated, the traditional French model has long
been constructed of multiple and interlocking elements. The rigidly
organized French institutional structure has ensured that judicial
decisionmaking functions as the catalyst for several professional hierarchies to work together to produce truly informed, high-level debates
between seasoned professionals. 26 4 In turn, the seclusion and protection provided by the characteristic French discursive bifurcation has
enabled those professionals to engage in particularly important types
of debate that tend to be off-limits to the public-namely, open-ended
discussions that explicitly consider issues of equity, substantive justice,
265
and socially responsive legal adaptation.
263
264

See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
See discussion supraPart I.B.2.

265

See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
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Having thus encouraged such frank and high-level judicial conversations, the French system has deployed the "sources of the law"
2 66
doctrine to cap the legal status of the resulting judicial decisions.
As a further safeguard, the French have minimized the argumentative
and normative centrality of these judicial decisions both by composing
them as relatively uninformative and highly formulaic syllogisms that
do not refer to prior jurisprudenceand by pairing importantjudgments
with decidedly more forthcoming doctrinal notes.267 Finally, the
French system's state-administered and meritocratic educational, vocational, institutional, and even conceptual structures have provided
the judicial system with the necessary political and social legitimacy by
establishing an ethos ofjustifiably elite representation. 26 In short, all
legal actors involved in French judicial decisionmaking have had to
earn their positions through rigidly meritocratic and explicitly statesanctioned processes.
As a result, the French system of judicial control, accountability,
and legitimacy rests upon the notion of quality. Appropriately elite
representation through explicitly meritocratic state institutions creates the requisite deliberative space for a select corps of actors to respond to the issues raised through litigation in an appropriately
subtle, communal, knowledgeable, and institutionally controlled manner. The quality of the judicial institution, of its membership, and of
its work-as measured by other elite initiates both inside and alongside the institution-functions as the primary guarantee of the institu2 69

tion's legitimacy.

B.

Incompatible Visions?

Needless to say, the ECHR's Borgers/Kressjurisprudence does not
mesh well with this closed, elite, republican, institutional, and qualitybased approach to judicial procedure. Demonstrating a far more populist and individualist bent, the ECHR has imposed procedural requirements that assume that the appropriate foundation of judicial
control and legitimacy lies in public access to, and engagement in,
legal argument. According to this democratic argumentative model,
public access to the arguments of individual judges functions as the
primary guarantee of accountable and legitimate judicial behavior.
See discussion supra Part I.B.4.
See supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
268
See discussion supra Part I.B.6.
260
It should, of course, be noted that this notion of quality assumes the existence of a
unified conceptual, educational, professional and institutional apparatus that ensures that
thejudiciary is meaningfully representative of French society. For a more detailed analysis
of these problematic assumptions, see LASSER, JuniciAL DELIBERATIONS, supra note 9, at
322-37.
266

267
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Now that we can clearly visualize the fundamental division between the two visions of judicial procedural justice operative in the
Borgers line of disputes, it should be abundantly clear why the ECHR's
jurisprudence has so shaken the French. Not only is the ECHR's reasoning, in some important sense, incomprehensible to the traditional
French understanding of the proper foundations of judicial legitimacy, but that reasoning even appears to require that those tradi270
tional foundations be actively subverted, if not entirely dismantled.
To those committed to the classic French conception, the
ECHR's Borgersjurisprudence appears as an affront: It effectively and
incomprehensibly mandates a decline in the quality of judicial decisionmaking. To the extent the judicial amicus can no longer play a
meaningful role within the legitimately protective walls of the judicial
institution, the quality-and thus the very integrity-of the French judicial decisionmaking process is compromised. Mirroring the substance of Procureurgtnral Burgelin's anguished remarks, 2 7 1 Premier
Avocat de Gouttes thus argues:
[The ECHR-imposed inability of the Advocates General to take
part fully in the Cour de cassation's deliberations] would be damaging . . . especially for the litigants themselves, who would be deprived in many cases of the guarantee provided by a second
examination of their cases by an Advocate General ....
Thus, paradoxically, the ECHR's jurisprudence runs the risk of
lowering the quality of the Cour de cassation's judgments, to create
inequalities in the treatment of cases, to limit the guarantees provided to the litigants and their attorneys, to lower the transparency
of the procedure and to impoverish and sterilize the debates, all of
which would, one would expect, run counter to the fundamental
272
objectives of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The exasperation of these French jurists is entirely rational. The
ECHR's jurisprudence does, in fact, rest on a fundamentally different
conception ofjudicial accountability and legitimacy than that underlying the traditional French system. As a result, the quality of French
judicial decisionmaking is being sacrificed to the ECHR's noncomprehension of the French system and to its incompatible notion of
2 73
proper judicial procedure.
Thus, ProfessorAndriantsimbazovina argues:
The European Convention is naturally an instrument for the deconstruction of state norms or practices that violate it. But it must not become a
tool for dismantling state institutions and practices that have proven themselves in the defense of fundamental rights: such is the case of the CDG in
the French administrative courts.
Andriantsimbazovina, supra note 190 (translation by author).
271 See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
de Gouttes, supra note 186 (translation by author).
272
273 Id.; see also Haim, supra note 192.
270

1070

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:995

But this is only the first part of the problem. Complicating matters is the fact that many French jurists have come to understand the
division between these two largely inconsistent judicial conceptions as
reflecting the common law/civil law divide. That is, to many French
commentators, the ECHR's Borgers/Kressjurisprudence has come to
represent the foisting of a common-law conception of adjudication
upon an unwilling French legal system. Thus Professors Bernard
Beignier and Corinne Bl6ry argue:
It is undeniable that European law has already had a significant influence on national law: whether by fear or by conviction, national
supreme courts have codified and continue to modify their jurisprudence to follow that of the Strasbourg Court. All of this follows more
or less from the European Convention on Human Rights. That
said, the ECHR, whose mission is supposed to consist of producing
"standards, sources of inspiration for national leaders ("responsables")," is not limiting itself to that mission. In fact, we are witnessing not the creation of standards born of "the meeting of
diverse national cultures, laws and experiences within common
structures," but rather the transformation of a legal rule particular
to a single legal system into a European dogma, the imposition on
all the member states of a law belonging to only one of them. It is

of course a truism to say that two radically different systems coexist
within Europe: the Common Law countries and the (written law)

countries of the Romano-Germanic tradition [i.e., the Civil Law
countries]. The reconciliation of the two is most often impossible,
which is to say that one or the other conception must be chosen [in
any given instance]. The notion of Uudicial] impartiality offers a

perfect illustration of this obligation to choose. As Mrs. Magnier
has so well demonstrated, the French conception is that of subjective
impartiality. But the French jurisprudence,under the influence of the
ECHR, has been driven to recognize the notion of objective impartiality, which rests essentially on appearances, an Anglo-American no274
tion if there ever was one.

Similarly, in an article absolutely dripping with sarcasm and indignation-not to mention humor-Professor Andriantsimbazovina
relates a dream conversation between an eminent colleague and a Marianne-like 275 fairy of French law who, in order to provoke the learned
colleague, mockingly inserts the ECHR's Borgers/Kressline of decisions
into-horror of horrors-the published editions collecting "The
274 Beignier and Bldry, supra note 173 (internal citations omitted) (translation by
author).
275 Marianne is the name of the female icon of the French Revolution, who wears a red
Phrygian cap of liberty. See generally Embassy of France in the United States, France from A
to Z: Marianne, available at http://www.info-france-usa.org/atoz/marianne.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2005).
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Great Cases and Decisions of French Law."'276 In response to the
learned scholar's indignant outbursts about the ECHR's destruction
of French legal culture and traditions, the fairy sarcastically answers:
Given that the ECHR possesses a hybrid conception of law that
mixes written and non-written law, Continental and Common Law,
it is satisfied with the current status of the [Conseil d'Etat's] notes in
deliberations, even if these notes are not formally established by
some legislative or administrative text. It is your training as a jurist
from the written law tradition that drives you to search at all costs in
the Kress decision for a non-existent requirement to legislate formally on this matter. And of course, what a paradox in your search!
A certain Anglo-Saxon approach to equitable procedure disembarks
onto the shores of French law, knocking everything over. Yet all you
can say to adapt your law to the requirements of the European Convention is: "Let's Legislate!" In conformity with this [new] European conception of equitable trial procedure, you should not
disturb the Anglo-Saxon charm of your administrative [executive]
law. The note in deliberations contributes to the respect of the ad277
versarial principle. That's good. What more do you want?

As these two passages demonstrate, French jurists commonly perceive the ECHR's Borgers/Kressjurisprudence not only to be destructive of the quality, and thus the legitimacy, of French judicial
decisionmaking, but also to represent an unwelcome common-law incursion. In fact, even advocate general Colomer of the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) has interpreted the ECHR's jurisprudence in
that light, arguing:
[T]he requirements of an adversarial process only call for particular judicial attention when a failure to observe them results in
the breach of a fundamental right, that is to say, when it causes a
breach of the rights of defence.
However, the European Court of Human Rights has adopted
the Anglo-Saxon notion of an adversarial process stating, in its judgment of 20 February 1996 in Vermeulen v Belgium, that it meant
"the opportunity for the parties in civil or criminal proceedings to
have knowledge of and comment on all evidence adduced or observations filed, even by an independent member of the national legal
service, with a view to influencing the court's decision." That caselaw has been approved on many occasions, without the utter impartiality and independence of the various judicial figures concerned

See Andriantsimbazovina, supra note 190.
Id. (translation by author); see alsoJean-Fran~ois Burgelin, La Paille et la poutre,
2004 D. Chron. 1249, 1252 (denouncing the ECHR's approach to the judiciary as "the
advance guard of American influence").
276
277
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(an impartiality and independence which permeates their278acts) having made the least impression on that line of argument.
Thus, the French are not the only ones reading the ECHR'sjurisprudence as an "Anglo-Saxon" invasion.
This conflation of the Borgers jurisprudence and common law legality should not be surprising. In fact, in certain respects, it is quite
understandable. The fundamental division between the French and
American conceptions of judicial control and legitimacy consists precisely of the distinction between the French republican-institutional
model and the American democratic-argumentative one. 2 79 The
French notion places its faith in the ability of meritocratic state institutions to represent the French citizenry in an organized and rational
manner. The American system, far more suspicious both of such a
unified understanding of the citizenry and of such an elite state institutional structure, places its trust in the ability of individual actors to
challenge argumentatively other individual actors who happen to argue from the bench.
In this French versus American context, the European Union's
chiefjudicial institution-the ECJ, as opposed to the ECHR-emerges
2 80
as a simultaneously promising and problematic in-between model.
On the one hand, its bifurcated discursive structure-including both
a short, collegial, unsigned, formal, and magisterial judicial decision
and a longer, signed, and more personal opinion of its individual advocates general-obviously reflects the French model upon which it
was originally based. On the other hand, its publication of the distinctly more policy-based advocate general opinions alongside the
ECJ's formal judicial decisions clearly represents a shift towards the
more individually oriented and argumentative American model. Operating in the EU's highly contested transnational normative context,
and thus lacking the unified and meritocratic educational, professional, and institutional structures of the French system from which it
derived, the ECJ thus militates distinctly towards a more argumenta28
tive mode of judicial control and legitimacy. '
If the ECJ, therefore, represents an in-between model ofjudicial
control and legitimacy, the ECHR itself-never mind its Borgers/Kress
jurisprudence-falls distinctly on the latter side of the republican-institutional versus democratic-argumentative divide. After all, the
ECHR's decisions are composed of relatively long, discursive, individually signed judicial opinions that come complete with concurrences
278

Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Gerry Plant and others v.

Commission of the European Communities, 2001 E.C.R. 0* (citations omitted).
See LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS, supra note 9, at 322-47.
279
280
See id. at 347-60.
281
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28 2
and dissents, overt and often heated disagreements, and the like.
To the French, therefore, the ECHR simply does not appear to be a
neutral arbiter in the Borgers line of litigation. To the contrary, one of
the two modes of judicial procedure is deeply intertwined with the
Strasbourg Court's own procedural model. This explains why the
French doctrinal literature is studded with what might otherwise appear to be vaguely paranoid suggestions that the ECHR's Borgersjurisprudence represents an Anglo-American, Anglo-Saxon, and common2 83
law attack on French civil-law judicial traditions.
As Procureurgenbral Burgelin maintains in an almost shockingly
overt passage:

Not that one should harbor excessive illusions: the Europe of the
Rights of Man is but the advance guard of American influence,
whose judicial culture is in the process of flooding the entire world.
Europeanization is but 4the mask of a globalization that is currently
28
submerging all of us.
The link between the European decisions (and Europe generally),
American judicial imperialism, and the death of French civil-law particularism could hardly be more apparent.
Of course, the cross-cultural noncomprehension demonstrated
by the ECHR's insensitive-and perhaps even destructive-jurisprudence is all but matched by the cross-cultural noncomprehension
demonstrated by the French academics' vehement and reductive responses. Indeed, it borders on the absurd for French jurists to suggest
that the ECHR's "doctrine of appearances" represents, in and of itself,
a central element of the common-law notion of equitable judicial procedure, never mind of common-law legality as a whole. If nothing
else, it is clearly simplistic to suggest that there exists a (single) AngloSaxon or common-law notion of equitable judicial procedure. Although this French oversimplification is tellingly blind to context, it is
not the key point.
What really matters is the fact that transparency and accessibility
are indeed extremely important to American common-law notions of
judicial control and legitimacy, but not merely for the sake of appearances. This misleading French oversimplification really sends the ensuing discussion down blind alleys, just as does, for example, the
misleading ECHR oversimplification that the French judicial amicus
should be considered an objective opponent of one of the parties to a
See, e.g., Kress v. France, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 41.
283 Guy Braibant-a noted scholar of French administrative law, longtime member of
the Conseil d'Etat, and French representative to the Convention for the drafting of European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights-suggests that this attack derives from the
high density of Anglo-Saxon attorneys pleading before the ECHR, as compared with the
relatively small number of French attorneys. Interview with Braibant, supra note 189.
284
See Burgelin, supra note 245, at 1252.
282
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given case merely because his suggested solution is likely to favor one
party's position over another.
Each of these generalizations fails to seek or consider-never
mind grasp-the guiding logic that underlies the other system. Each
oversimplification focuses on characteristics that foreign observers
may readily observe and then categorize in ways that make perfect
sense in the context of their home systems. Yet each fundamentally
misses the ways in which the observed characteristics may fit sensiblyand perhaps quite centrally-into the framework of the other system.
As a result, each ends up discussing radically decontextualized individual facets of the other system's decisionmaking procedure without
ever grasping either (a) how that particular facet fits into the system's
material and conceptual whole, or (b) how seemingly minor proposed
adjustments might, in fact, quite seriously undermine the ethos and
operation of the other system.
Thus, the ECHR's oversimplification and the indignant French
doctrinal response each miserably fails to grasp the other. It is probably for this very reason that the Borgers line of litigation so often appears to consist of unfocused and vaguely uncomprehending
accusations, tepid and half-hearted responses, and the like. Neither
side ever really engages the other straight-on by recognizing, acknowledging, and appropriately responding to its concerns. Instead, the debate gets shunted off into subissues such as "equality of arms,"
"objective opponents," "quality," and "appearances," each of which
seems vitally important to one side in the dispute but relatively trivial,
misguided, or even silly to the other.
For instance, the ECHR's insistence upon the right of the parties
to respond to the oral arguments of the judicial amicus, which to any
American common-law jurist would undoubtedly seem so central to
equitable trial procedure that one could hardly imagine a fair trial
without it, represents little more than a nominal professional courtesy
to knowledgeable French jurists. Given that no part of traditional
French judicial procedure endeavors to encourage or require an attorney's oral response, the ECHR's demands function as nothing
more than a useless and awkward intervention.
After all, what is the use of setting up an elaborate new oral procedure when litigants almost never attend or participate in oral arguments in the first place? Why invite the reopening of adversarial
responses when the parties have already had ample -opportunities to
put forward their respective arguments, responses, counter-responses,
and the like (in writing)?28 5 Moreover, why do so at precisely the
point when partisan argument has finally come to an end and the case
285

See supra Part III.A.2.
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has been handed over to the judicial magistrates? Why drive the
highly knowledgeable, deeply respected, and totally nonpartisan judicial amicus out of deliberations at all, especially when the French bar
has argued so staunchly against such exclusion?28 6 And why, in so doing, force some ridiculous procedural solution, such as requiring either the judicial amicus or the judicial panel to leave the typically
deserted courtroom so that they can be sequestered from each other
for the sake of the (now impoverished) deliberations, only to reunite
28 7
shortly thereafter to move onto the next case?
Therefore, and quite frustratingly, the ECHR and French jurists
constantly seem to be missing the other's true point. The French doctrinal literature, for its part, has repeatedly reduced the ECHR's
Borgers/Kresslitigation to a struggle between real, high-quality judicial
procedure on the one hand and mere "appearances" on the other.
Professor Haim argues sarcastically:
Since, after the Kress decision, it must be recognized that the appearance of equitable trial process carries more weight than the reality thereof, and that to save appearances one must deprive
litigants of the guarantee provided by the CDG's active participation
in the work performed by the judicial panel88 of which he is a mem2
ber, let's just abolish the CDG altogether.
At the close of a more sober article, Professor Haim makes this point
in a more straightforward fashion: "In these conditions . . . it is far
from certain that litigants or the quality of the decisions of the administrative courts would have much to gain from the mirage of more
28 9
open collegial debate."
Demonstrating the same fundamental conceptual framework,
Professors Beignier and Bh4ry declare:
To invoke a principle [in this case, "impartiality"] against its application truly amounts, in the precise sense of the term, to pervert it. It
is not really to distort principles; to misrepresent their scope is to
dissolve them. Academic doctrine appreciates very much the English
legal adage that it has happily discovered and now plays with as if it
were a play of mirrors: 'Justice must not only be done, it must also
anbe seen to be done." To this, the Cour de cassation has sanely
2 90
swered: 'Justice involves reality, not merely appearances."
The French bar argued strongly for maintaining the traditional French system of
286
decisionmaking. See Kress, 2001-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 65 (discussing the significance of the
French bar's position).
287
See Les riquisitions de lavocat general ne peuvent tre transmises avant l'audience au demandeur en cassation, celles-ci 9tant prasenties oralement d l'audience, D. 1998 Somm. 176, note
Pradel; Burgelin, supra note 245, at 1250.
288
Haim, supra note 191.
289
Haim, supra note 192.
Beignier and Bl6ry, supra note 173.
290
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In each of these instances, the French academic responds to the
poorly contextualized, badly theorized, and thus, clumsy and misdirected ECHR jurisprudence with equally poorly contextualized, badly
theorized, clumsy, and misdirected defensive responses. To state the
obvious, the ECHR's jurisprudence-or, for that matter, "AngloAmerican," "Anglo-Saxon," or some other form of common-law legality-is no more about mere appearances than French legality is about
partisan judges.
In contrast, if the current ECHR disputes over fairjudicial procedure were to be addressed in a serious and knowledgeable fashion,
the resulting discussion would look very different. Suddenly, instead
of focusing on decontextualized side issues, the debate would consider far more meaningful, broader, and thus, by necessity, far more
difficult and perhaps even disturbing, questions. In essence, the key
question is nothing more elaborate than this: Is the French republicaninstitutional model of judicial decisionmakingequitable?
Despite its patently massive scope, it is not really possible to reduce this distressingly broad question into significantly smaller and
more manageable parts. This is because, as we have seen over and
over again, equality of arms, informational rights, response rights, and
the like are far too parochial in meaning and relevance to function
effectively as cross-contextually sensitive standards of analysis. As Antoine Garapon insightfully explains in his new book, even the notion
of adversarial exchange does not mean the same thing or function in
the same way in different legal systems:
The French system feels the need for adversarial debate in order to improve the quality of justice, but unable-or unwilling-to
leave it to private parties, it has largely internalized this adversarial
dimension. Adversarial argument is provided by another professional judicial magistrate who provides an independent point of
view. That is the raison d 'tre of the Advocate General at the Cour de
cassation or of the CDG, of which one hears so much about these
days now that the ECHR has called them into question.
Both the Conseil d'Etat and the Cour de cassation demonstrate
the need to promote adversarial exchange both for the sake of the
good administration of justice and in order to stimulate the legal
imagination, but they are leery of leaving it to the parties themselves

[In France,] this judicial] exchange must remain internal. In
fact, "if the Uudicial amicus] opinion were made subject to response
by the parties, this would necessarily damage the frankness of his
dialogue with the sitting judicial panel and would therefore damage
the quality of the decisions of the Conseil d'Etat." The internal nature of the dialogue thus contributes to the quality of the judicial
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process-or such is the belief in France-while the Common Law
takes exactly the opposite view ....
...[I] n French legal culture, rigorous dialogue within a collegial institution inspires more confidence than does an "external"
29
argument. '
In short, one must approach and consider the French (or any other)
approach to judicial decisionmaking with enormous sensitivity to the
rich, complex, and distinctive intellectual, cultural, and material
framework in which, through which, and by which that approach
operates.
Needless to say, the sheer magnitude of such a task is terribly
daunting. But, frankly, without making such an investment, the interaction between the ECHR and the French supreme courts is condemned to be a largely piecemeal, haphazard, and even rather
random affair, in which each side latches onto some specific position
or practice of the other, misrepresents and misunderstands it by
decontextualizing it, and thus provokes changes, the eventual repercussions and significance of which-if predictable at all-are never
understood in the first place. Analyzing the facets of each judicial or
legal system in an atomized and acontextual manner simply drives the
discussion away from what really ought to be the overarching and determinative question: Is the French-or for that matter, the ECHR292
model of judicial decisionmaking fai?
To my mind, it is enormously helpful to develop certain shorthand heuristic structures that both direct and check the manner in
which one approaches such an enormous and yet slippery question.
For this reason, I have taken to using the terms "republican-institutional" and "democratic-argumentative" to conceptualize and analyze
the relationship between French, American, and European judicial
decisionmaking. 293 These terms are sunmary descriptions that nonetheless highlight the rich conceptual and material universes in which
any given facet of the observed legal system perpetually resides. The
terms thus function simultaneously as reminders and warnings of all
that surrounds the specific issues and practices under analysis. To the
extent that such heuristic crutches help the comparatist to keep the
contextual big-picture in mind, the key question-is the given
(French, ECHR, or even U.S.) model of judicial decisionmaking
fair -can then be approached in a manner that is not only more
comprehensive, but also more nuanced and precise.
291
GARAPON & PAPADOPOULOS, supra note 189, at 110-12 (quoting Fr6d6ric Rollin,
Note under C.E. 29July 1998, L'Actualitd juridique-Droit administratif, 20Jan. 1999, 72).
Interview with Costa, supra note 184.
292
293
See, e.g., LASSER, JUDICLAL DELIBERATIONS, Supra note 9, passim; see also, e.g., supra Part
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Thus, for example, one of the most remarkable aspects of the
Borgers/Kressjurisprudence is the ECHR's categorical refusal to distinguish at all on the basis of the different subject matter jurisdictions of
the various supreme courts at issue. In fact, as we have seen, the
ECHR has openly scoffed at the repeated attempts of the national supreme courts to distinguish themselves on such grounds from the Bel294
gian procureurggnral criticized in Borgers.
Although the ECHR's implicit suggestion that self-preservation
was a significant motivation in the arguments made on behalf of the
assorted French-style supreme courts is undoubtedly correct, the subject matter distinctions were, nonetheless, well worth taking seriously.
It is, in fact, a very good question whether an institutional mode of
elite and expert representation of litigated issues might be quite desirable and effective in certain kinds of disputes but decidedly less appealing in others. For example, even the American legal system is full
of substantive areas of law in which specialized administrative agencies, such as the NLRB or the EEOC, press claims on behalf of particular types of plaintiffs. This kind of specialized institutional handling
of litigated issues is by no means inherently unusual or suspect.295 In-

deed, for public law controversies involving the proper exercise of interbranch governmental power, it may be entirely reasonable to
deploy a system in which individual citizen complaints trigger an institutional mode of review by seasoned, knowledgeable and elite administrative veterans, who, shielded by collegial-and thus externally
opaque-institutional structures, would be protected from governmental pressure.
On the other hand, the assessment of such an expert institutional
approach could reasonably lead to different conclusions in the criminal context. It is entirely plausible that the deeply personal liberty
interests at stake in criminal trials might lean in favor of a more individually controlled, democratic-argumentative model. With personal
reputation and even freedom at stake, the criminal defendant may
prefer to control his or her own fate in such matters. Thus, he or she
could reasonably conclude that defending against a criminal prosecution is not the time to trust the operation of the judicial decisionmaking process, no matter how representative the institutional structures
may be of the population as a whole, and no matter how elite and
expert the institutional actors may be. In other words, the more individually pressing the subject matter of the judicial proceeding, the
294

See supra note 201 and accompanying text.

295

Of course, there have been lively arguments for and against such agency represen-

tation. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Public vs. PrivateEnforcerment of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. Rv. 1401 (1998); Michael Selmi, The Value of the
EEOC: Reexamining the Agency's Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHio ST. L.J. 1
(1996).
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more the citizen may wish to manage the case on his or her own
behalf.
Of course, this more nuanced and subject-sensitive analysis, in
which the ECHR has simply refused to engage, immediately drives
one to consider ever more specific and contextually embedded issues.
For example, is there any reason to believe that anyone aside from a
statistically microscopic number of criminal defendants might actually
be better off-materially, philosophically, politically, or otherwisefor having been granted the nominal capacity to manage the argumentation of their criminally litigated affairs? 296 Needless to say, the
answer to this kind of question is hody debated, even in the American
academic literature. There certainly exists no shortage of commentators/comparativists who argue that the crushing reality of Americanstyle plea bargaining has almost totally undermined the great individual constitutional protections theoretically afforded by full-blown
29 7
American criminal trial procedure.
It is not my intention to resolve such questions on the merits in
this Article. Instead, my point is simply to illustrate just how different
such questions are from those addressed by the ECHR in its Borgers/
Kress jurisprudence. These questions call for highly specific and
deeply contextualized examinations: What are, inter alia, the litigation
structures, the professional frameworks, the educational processes,
the administrative hierarchies, the institutional and political modes of
oversight, the selection and advancement mechanisms, the daily professional routines, the institutional budgets, and the attorney fee arrangements-never mind the dominant and/or conflicting mindsets
and social welfare mechanisms-that operate in the particular branch
of the national legal system under scrutiny, as well as in the legal and
political culture as a whole? How could one possibly try to resolve
questions of comparative procedural justice on the merits without addressing such issues head-on?
296
Some thirty years ago, Mijan Damaska asked, in his inimitable way, whether the
elaborate, but rare, American evidentiary style is preferable to a more realistic, and thus
more generally available, one:
Assuming that we are not bound by preexisting legal donnies, is it better to
have a very elaborate evidentiary style which, in an age of ever increasing
crime rates, we can afford to use only in a miniscule fraction of cases, or to
devise factfinding systems which, while less demanding, might then be applied universally? It is almost like asking a lady whether she prefers an
orchid once a year or a modest bouquet every day.
Mirjan Damaika, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of CriminalProcedure: A
Comparative Study, 121 U. Pa. L. REv. 506, 552 (1973).
297
Al Alschuler has long been the central figure in this debate. See, e.g., Albert W.
Alschuler, The ChangingPlea BargainingDebate, 69 CAL. L. RaV. 652 (1981); Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the CriminalDefendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining
System, 50 U. CHI. L. Raw. 931 (1983).
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In short, the frighteningly broad question-is the procedural
model fair?-informed and guided by well-developed heuristic tools,
pushes not only towards more comprehensive and holistic, but also
toward more nuanced and precise, comparative analysis. Such a question invites and even requires one to contextualize. The issue of comparative procedural justice cannot merely consist of measuring each
system's promises. In other words, the heuristic tools are not an end
in themselves. They are not only meant to arrive at a massively abstract, though actually quite illuminating and interesting, analysis of
the theoretical pros and cons of Jacobin versus libertarian visions, or
of democratic versus republican approaches. They are also meant to
raise these conceptual frameworks precisely in order to embed them
in, and to allow them to inform our understanding of, the specific
material and institutional environments in which and through which
they operate.
To summarize in broad terms, the Borgers litigation puts two fundamentally different models ofjudicial decisionmaking into play. The
first, which is fairly reminiscent of the American model, and which the
ECHR itself largely replicates, offers an argumentativeframework and a
democratic ethos. The second, which is characteristic of the French
model and its descendents, offers an institutionalframework and a republican ethos. Focusing as it has on decontextualized particulars, the
ECHR has missed this big picture and has, therefore, failed to tie
these particulars into their complex conceptual and material
frameworks.
To be blunt, the ECHR has been engaging in bad comparativelaw practice. The Court has been fiddling around the edges of the
French model of judicial decisionmaking, attempting to paste onto it
some more democratic and participatory-looking argumentative trappings. Given the institutional context of the French system, however,
such accouterments add little that is of practical use to litigants, despite the fact that they seriously threaten to undermine the existing
republican and institutional bases of French judicial control and
legitimacy.
The paradox is that things could have been a lot worse. In some
important sense, the ECHR's blindness to the bigger conceptual and
material picture has limited the scope of the potential conflict between the ECHR and French procedural models. Had the ECHR
worked out a coherently theorized understanding of the different logics implicitly underlying the two models, the budding quarrel between
them could easily have turned into an immediate fight for the French
model's very survival. In this way, the Borgers/Kress litigation provides
an example of the old adage that ignorance is bliss. This very ignorance has permitted the ECHR to focus on inducing what may-de-
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pending on the ongoing negotiation of the numerous institutions and
players involved-prove in the long-term to be relatively cosmetic
French adjustments, rather than provoking a more comprehensive
and thus potentially final and irreparable confrontation.
CONCLUSION

The ECHR's Borgers/Kress jurisprudence has entailed a highly
problematic trade-off. In exchange for dubious argumentative gains
for litigants, the ECHR has, at the very least, endangered the future of
the traditionally republican and institutional foundations of French
judicial control and legitimacy.
On one side of the equation, the republican and institutional
structures of French judicial decisionmaking have undoubtedly been
somewhat weakened. The judicial amicus has been threatened with
professional isolation. Such banishment not only sacrifices the vital
conversation between thejudicial amicus and the rapporteur, but also
compromises the meritocratic French system of professional education, training, promotion, and oversight. As a result, both the shortand long-term quality of internal French judicial deliberations have
been damaged, which subverts precisely the republican and institutional logic thatjustifies the traditional French system of judicial control and legitimacy.
On the other side of the equation, the ECHR has pushed for reforms that fit awkwardly in the French procedural framework. For example, the ECHR has sought to promote litigants' ability to access and
respond to what had traditionally been largely internal judicial arguments, and the Court has worked to reshape appearances by barring
the amicus from judicial deliberations. But, as we have seen, however
sensible such reforms may seem when viewed through the more individual and adversarial lens of the democratic-argumentative model,
they border on arbitrary and nonsensical when viewed through the
more collegial and deliberative lens of the republican-institutional
model. Grafted pell-mell onto the traditional French decisionmaking
procedures, such reforms-without more-do little to improve the argumentative capacity of the litigating public.
As a result, this rather poor trade-off has provoked strong French
responses. To those most closely tied-intellectually, professionally
and symbolically-to the traditional French order, namely, the Conseil d'Etat, the answer has been to minimize the damage by half-heartedly adopting half-measures. Stonewalling as best it can, the Conseil
d'Etat has held onto its old ways with much resolve and a certain measure of success.
But for others, such as the PremierPrisident of the Cour de cassation, the answer has been to make the most of the situation by institut-
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ing a wave of absolutely fascinating-and, perhaps not surprisingly,
tactically advantageous-reform. Far from resisting the ECHR, Chief
Justice Canivet has thus seized the opportunity to institute what can
only be considered a major overhaul of the Cour's internal procedure. This set of procedural reforms all but sacrifices the advocate
general. Indeed, banished from pre- and post-oral argument judicial
deliberations and denied access to the rapporteurs preparatory work,
the advocate general is suddenly skating on the edge of procedural
irrelevance. Similarly, now that public explanation and transmission
of knowledge about French judicial decisions has been entrusted to
the rapporteur,the academic writer-traditionally at the very center of
the ongoing French process of judicial normative development-has
largely become yet another passive judicial observer. In short, these
reforms stand to alter the theory and practice of the Cour de cassation's decisionmaking quite significantly and are eventually likely to
do the same at the Conseil d'Etat.
Needless to say, such internal Frenchjockeying in response to the
ECHR's awkward external prodding represents a field day for comparativists interested in the complex interplay between the French
and European legal systems. But only time will tell whether this schismatic French response actually benefits the French public in some
significant way or offers a fertile environment for the potentially largescale reordering of the balance of normative power in the French judicial system.
The danger, of course, lies in the possibility that the Cour de cassation's reforms grant a new argumentative prominence-and thus
normative dominance-to the Cour and its judges (precisely what the
traditional French system was designed to avoid), without counterbalancing or taming this new judicial power with sufficiently effective individual, public, and argumentative judicial accountability. In other
words, these reforms may undermine the existing republican and institutional bases of French judicial control and legitimacy without going far enough in the direction of the democratic-argumentative
model to make up for the loss.
Instead, the Cour de cassation's reforms appear to move distinctly
in the direction of what one may properly identify as the emergent,
pasteurized, and bland hodge-podge model that characterizes the European Court ofJustice. That is, these reforms maintain much of the
traditional French forms from which they derive, but also adopt a certain-and perhaps insufficient-measure of the more argumentative
features that tend to characterize ECHR, and especially American, ju298
dicial decisionmaking.
298
For a more detailed analysis of the ECJ's conglomerate decisionmaking model, see
generally LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS, supra note 9.
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In an amusing historical twist, therefore, the very existence of the
ECJ's own conglomerate model places an effective cap on just how far
the ECHR is likely to force the French in the direction of the democratic-argumentative ideal. As a matter of sheer realpolitik, it is more
or less inconceivable that the ECHR would condemn the French, for
example, for failing to provide sufficient public access to the arguments of individual judges, or for failing to allow concurrences and
dissents, because then the ECHR would have to do the politically unthinkable: condemn the ECJ as well.
Amazingly enough, it may be that the French model's once-powerful influence will turn out to be precisely what now ensures its continued survival, if only in the foreseeable future. But the cost of that
survival may be the adoption of more individually oriented argumentative features that might undermine the very justification for that
model's existence, i.e., the complex republican and institutional matrix that has given the traditional French system its unusually deliberative-though highly externally uncommunicative-character. In the
long-term, therefore, the ECHR's Borgers/Kressjurisprudence and the
Cour de cassation's ensuing reforms really could mark the beginning
of the end-or the beginning of a creative new beginning-of the
French civil-law model of judicial decisionmaking.
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